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ACCOUNTABILITY CLAIMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos 
ABSTRACT—Several of the Supreme Court’s most controversial 
constitutional doctrines hinge on claims about electoral accountability. 
Restrictions on the President’s power to remove agency heads are disfavored 
because they reduce the President’s accountability for agency actions. 
Congress cannot delegate certain decisions to agencies because then 
Congress is less accountable for those choices. State governments cannot be 
federally commandeered because such conscription lessens their 
accountability. And campaign spending must be unregulated so that more 
information reaches voters and helps them to reward or punish incumbents 
for their performances. 
There is just one problem with these claims. They are wrong—at least 
for the most part. To illustrate their error, I identify four conditions that must 
be satisfied in order for incumbents to be held accountable. Voters must (1) 
know about incumbents’ records, (2) form judgments about them, (3) 
attribute responsibility for them, and (4) cast ballots based on these 
judgments and attributions. I then present extensive empirical evidence 
showing that these conditions typically are not met in the scenarios 
contemplated by the Court. The crux of the problem is that voters are less 
informed than the Court supposes, more likely to be biased by their partisan 
affiliations, and less apt to vote retrospectively than in some other way. 
Accountability thus does not rise in response to the Court’s interventions—
at least not much. 
The qualifiers, though, are important. If the Court’s claims are mostly 
wrong, then they are partly right. If accountability does not rise much due to 
the Court’s efforts, then it does go up a bit. These points are established by 
the same studies that document the general inadequacy of the Court’s 
reasoning. With respect to certain voters in certain settings, accountability is 
influenced by presidential control over agencies, congressional delegation to 
agencies, federal commandeering of state governments, and regulation of 
campaign spending. That is why this Article discounts accountability as a 
constitutional value but not does reject it altogether. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Say (not implausibly) that a natural disaster strikes and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responds poorly to it. FEMA is 
an executive agency whose head may be removed at will by the President.1 
At the next election, does this feature of FEMA’s mean that voters will 
 
 1 See About the Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency [https://perma.cc/3R2V-
L2VQ]. 
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punish the President more harshly for the agency’s subpar performance than 
if it were an independent body more insulated from presidential control? In 
other words, is the President more electorally accountable for the actions of 
an agency over which she exercises more authority? 
Now assume (a bit less accurately) that Congress previously delegated 
to FEMA the power to respond to disasters as the agency sees fit.2 Thanks to 
this delegation, Congress need not take any new steps when the present 
calamity arises. Instead, it may sit back and allow FEMA to lead the relief 
effort. At the next election, will voters be more apt to support members of 
Congress than if they had been compelled to address the emergency 
themselves (stipulating legislative ineptitude equal to the agency’s)? That is, 
does Congress reduce its electoral accountability by delegating authority in 
earlier periods and so avoiding difficult decisions in later ones? 
A third scenario: Under current law, state governments are the front-
line responders to disasters. It is up to them whether to deal with crises on 
their own or to request a federal declaration that paves the way for federal 
assistance.3 They cannot be commandeered into carrying out a federal relief 
program against their will. If state politicians bungle the situation, then, does 
their autonomy mean they will incur worse consequences at the polls than if 
they had been dragooned by the feds? Does the ban on commandeering 
increase their electoral accountability? 
And a fourth case: At present, campaign spending is unrestricted in all 
American elections.4 There is no limit to the amount of money that may be 
used to convey to voters unattractive aspects of incumbents’ records—such 
as their flawed responses to disasters. Do these unchecked outlays cause 
incumbents to pay a steeper price for poor performance than if the river of 
money (and information) did not gush as freely? Does campaign finance 
deregulation improve electoral accountability? 
The Supreme Court gives the same answer to all of these questions: yes. 
Yes, the President is more accountable for the actions of agencies whose 
heads she may remove at will.5 Yes, Congress is less accountable when it 
 
 2 This assumption is imperfect because FEMA was created by an executive order in 1979, not by an 
explicit delegation of congressional power. See id. However, Congress did provide the agency with 
statutory authority—and establish the current cooperative federalist approach to emergency relief—in the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 
(1988). 
 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2012) (providing that “[a]ll requests for a declaration by the President that a 
major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State”). 
 4 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (finding “no basis for allowing the 
Government to limit . . . independent expenditures”). 
 5 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010) 
(holding that a limit on the President’s removal power “subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the 
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farms out important decisions to agencies.6 Yes, state governments are more 
accountable when they are not pressed into service by their federal 
overseers.7 And yes, incumbents at all levels are more accountable when no 
cap exists on campaign spending.8 
What is more, the Court’s accountability claims are no casual asides. 
Rather, they are pillars of some of the most consequential holdings in all of 
constitutional law. The President’s (allegedly) enhanced accountability for 
agencies with easily discarded heads helps explain why limits on her removal 
power are disfavored.9 Congress’s (supposedly) lessened accountability 
when it assigns significant matters to agencies is one of the justifications for 
the nondelegation doctrine.10 That state governments are (ostensibly) more 
accountable when they are not federally conscripted partly accounts for the 
prohibition of commandeering.11 And that incumbents are (purportedly) 
more accountable when campaign spending is unfettered is one reason why 
expenditure restrictions are unlawful.12 
As the parentheticals hint, this Article’s thesis is that the Court’s 
accountability claims are wrong—at least for the most part. In recent years, 
there has been an outpouring of political science scholarship on the causes 
of electoral accountability. This literature is largely inconsistent with the 
Court’s assertions. It suggests that accountability does not budge, at least not 
much, in response to factors as fine as presidential removal authority, 
congressional delegation, federal commandeering, and campaign finance 
regulation. But the caveats—for the most part, largely, at least not much—
are noteworthy too. There is a grain of truth in the Court’s analysis, though 
only in certain unusual circumstances. That is why this Article discounts 
accountability as a constitutional value but does not reject it altogether. 
 
laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts”); see also 
infra Section II.A. 
 6 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“When fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about 
to be enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress . . . .”); see also infra Section II.B. This answer 
is phrased differently than the others (Congress is less accountable when it delegates, not more 
accountable when it does not) because of the desuetude of the nondelegation doctrine. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (quipping that the doctrine “has had 
one good year, and 211 bad ones”). 
 7 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal Government 
compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”); see also 
infra Section II.C. 
 8 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it 
is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”); see also infra Section II.D. 
 9 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 498. 
 10 See Indus. Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 11 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
 12 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339. 
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Before delving into the political scientists’ findings, a working 
definition of electoral accountability is essential. It is voters rewarding (by 
voting for) elected officials for good decisions and outcomes, and punishing 
(by voting against) them for bad ones. So conceived, electoral accountability 
operates through the mechanism of retrospective voting, that is, voting on 
the basis of incumbents’ past records. Retrospective voting, in turn, occurs 
only if four conditions are met: (1) voters know about these records; (2) 
voters form judgments about them; (3) voters attribute responsibility for 
them; and (4) voters cast ballots based on these judgments and attributions.13 
Of course, not all accountability is electoral. Within hierarchical 
organizations we find managerial accountability: subordinates being 
rewarded by their supervisors for good decisions and outcomes, and 
punished for bad ones. In many contexts there is also legal accountability: 
the judicial system’s imposition of penalties for violations of the law. More 
colloquially, people are personally accountable to their friends and loved 
ones, ethically accountable to themselves, and so on. But while they are 
undeniably important, I bracket these other types of accountability here. 
They are not the types about which the Court has made strong claims in the 
course of announcing controversial constitutional rules. They are therefore 
not my present concern.14 
Similarly, not all voting is retrospective. One alternative, in fact, is its 
exact opposite: prospective voting based on candidates’ expected future 
behavior. Another option is spatial voting for candidates whose policy 
positions are closer ideologically to the voter’s. Still other possibilities 
include voting on the basis of candidates’ partisan affiliations, demographic 
traits, or valence qualities. And this is not a pick-one game; voters can (and 
do) vote on multiple grounds simultaneously.15 
Unlike the other kinds of accountability, I do not bracket these rival 
modes of voting. Their existence, in fact, is an essential reason why the 
Court’s claims fall flat. If voters are not voting retrospectively to begin with, 
then electoral accountability cannot be improved by requiring or forbidding 
certain institutional arrangements. 
So what have political scientists concluded about how voters cast their 
ballots? At the presidential level, some retrospective voting does take 
place—but based on coarse-grained factors like the state of the economy, not 
subtler issues like specific agency actions. In direct comparative tests, 
retrospective voting is also dominated by prospective, spatial, partisan, and 
 
 13 See infra Section I.A. 
 14 See infra Section I.B. 
 15 See infra Section I.C. 
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demographic voting.16 At the congressional level, retrospective economic 
voting is even less common, and the vast majority of members’ votes carry 
no electoral consequences. Meanwhile, a non-congressional variable—the 
President’s approval rating—emerges as a potent driver of vote choice. 
Congressional elections are thus partly second-order: races shaped by 
developments at other governmental levels.17 As for the states, their elections 
are predominantly, not just partly, second-order affairs. State legislative 
results correlate nearly perfectly with national trends, while scholars debate 
whether governors’ economic and fiscal records affect at all their showings 
at the polls.18 
This evidence relates to the last condition for retrospective voting: 
whether voters cast ballots based on their judgments of, and attributions for, 
past decisions and outcomes. The answer is no, or more precisely, not to a 
significant extent. Other studies shed light on the first condition: whether 
voters even know about the decisions and outcomes in the first place. Here, 
too, the empirical verdict is negative, revealing another reason why the 
Court’s accountability claims are implausible. Voters simply are not 
informed enough about agency actions, Congress members’ positions, or 
state government policies to vote on their basis. 
A half-century of survey research documents Americans’ startling 
ignorance of officeholders’ records. Most respondents cannot name a single 
bill their congressional representatives have supported or opposed over the 
past few years. Their awareness of agency regulations and state laws, which 
typically attract less media coverage, is even more scant. And their lack of 
knowledge of individual actions is not offset by familiarity with the actions’ 
overall effects. Large fractions of respondents hold inaccurate views of 
economic growth, the unemployment rate, the budget deficit, and a host of 
other indicators.19 
Turning to the second condition for retrospective voting—whether 
voters are able to form judgments about policies and their consequences—
the literature points to a superficially optimistic but ultimately gloomy 
conclusion. The good news is that voters are willing to offer assessments of 
all sorts of issues. The trouble is that these evaluations are weakly tethered 
to objective reality and heavily swayed by voters’ partisan affiliations. 
Democratic voters tend to approve of Democratic officeholders’ records 
 
 16 See infra Section III.A. To save space and avoid repetition, I do not provide citations here for my 
summary of the political science literature on accountability. The relevant citations are supplied—in 
abundance—in Part III, infra.  
 17 See infra Section III.B. 
 18 See infra Section III.C. 
 19 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
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(even when poor) and to frown on those of Republican incumbents (even 
when strong). Republican voters exhibit the opposite pattern. As a result, the 
policy appraisals on which retrospective voting depends are distorted. 
Incumbents are not punished by their copartisans even when they should be, 
or rewarded by the opposing party’s supporters even when they deserve it.20 
This leaves the third condition: whether voters are able to attribute 
responsibility correctly to elected officials. Most of the Court’s 
accountability claims involve this condition; their premise is that voters 
make better attributions when the President has more control over agencies, 
Congress delegates fewer decisions, and state governments are more 
autonomous. But for a pair of reasons that should already be unsurprising, 
this premise is flawed. First, most voters know little about which institution 
is in charge of which policy. Only about half of the public can identify the 
majority party in Congress, and this fraction drops further for state 
legislatures. Much of the public also believes the President is responsible for 
events that are outside her ambit: congressional gridlock, national economic 
trends, natural disasters, and the like.21 
Second, voters’ attributions are biased by their partisan affiliations. 
When conditions are good, they tend to give credit to their own party. When 
circumstances are worse, they usually deem it the other party’s fault. Who is 
thought to be in charge is therefore highly variable, shifting in response to 
policy assessments (themselves driven by partisanship) and configurations 
of party control. In combination, these arguments pull the rug from under the 
Court’s claims. Accountability cannot rise much due to greater presidential 
authority, less congressional delegation, or more state governmental 
independence, because these factors are dwarfed by voters’ ignorance of 
institutional duties and readiness to adjust their attributions on partisan 
grounds. The Court assumes a level of sophistication and impartiality on the 
part of voters that they mostly fail to meet.22 
The Court further errs in its assertions about campaign finance 
regulation, though for different reasons that relate jointly to all four 
conditions for retrospective voting. Here the problem is that while regulation 
may reduce total outlays, and so the information available to voters about 
candidates’ records, it also makes elections more competitive, thus 
increasing accountability. Why does regulation lead to more competitive 
elections? Because it typically constrains incumbents more than challengers, 
shrinking the former’s spending advantage and, with it, their margin of 
 
 20 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
 21 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
 22 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
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victory. And why does more intense competition result in greater 
accountability? Both because incumbents are more likely to lose in closer 
races and, intriguingly, because voters become better informed and more apt 
to vote retrospectively as elections grow more unpredictable. Put these 
findings together and the Court has it exactly backward. It is the imposition 
of campaign finance limits, not their removal, that makes incumbents more 
accountable to the electorate.23 
By this point, a reader may be forgiven for wondering why this Article 
insists on discounting—but not rejecting—accountability. What is left to 
salvage in the Court’s claims? In fact, they may have some validity, at least 
for certain voters in certain situations. The arguments’ outright disavowal is 
therefore premature. Start with the President’s power to remove agency 
heads. Recent studies find that voters attribute more responsibility to the 
President when they learn from the media that she has more sway over an 
agency. Of course, many voters fail to receive this information, and even 
those that do may cast their ballots on other grounds. Nevertheless, one of 
the conditions for retrospective voting is more likely to be satisfied under the 
Court’s preferred institutional arrangement.24 
Likewise, other work shows that while members of Congress face no 
electoral consequences for most of their votes, some of their stances do 
matter at the polls. This suggests that if the nondelegation doctrine were 
enforced, obliging Congress to tackle issues it currently assigns to agencies, 
members would be held accountable for at least a few of their extra 
decisions.25 Additionally, even though most voters cannot say which level of 
government is responsible for which policy, better educated voters 
sometimes possess this knowledge. This informed minority can reward or 
punish state officeholders for decisions that were, in fact, theirs to make.26 
Lastly, one major category of campaign finance regulation—the banning of 
“soft money” donations to political parties—does reduce competition, and 
with it, accountability. Parties channel most of their soft money to 
challengers, so when this spigot is turned off, incumbents can breathe a bit 
easier.27 
But these are all silver linings on a dark cloud. The Court’s 
accountability claims are much more wrong than right, which raises the 
question of why the Court’s assertions are so inaccurate. The most 
sympathetic explanation is that the Court wishes to promote accountability 
 
 23 See infra Section III.D. 
 24 See infra Section III.A. 
 25 See infra Section III.B. 
 26 See infra Section III.C. 
 27 See infra Section III.D. 
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because it (justifiably) considers it a vital democratic value. The Court then 
latches onto the forces under its control that seem most apt to improve 
accountability, most of which involve the relations between governmental 
institutions. But these forces are not actually as potent as the Court thinks. 
Fundamental institutional decisions—whether to separate powers or fuse 
them, or whether to create a unitary or federal system—indeed have dramatic 
implications for accountability. These kinds of choices, though, are not 
within the Court’s jurisdiction. Nor are the key non-institutional drivers of 
accountability: voters’ knowledge, partisanship, and mode of voting. At their 
core, these are matters of voter psychology, not constitutional law.28 
This is not to say the Court could not advance accountability more 
adeptly than it has to date. For one thing, it could temper its hostility toward 
campaign finance regulation, which unlike the policies the Court believes 
make incumbents more accountable, demonstrably does so. For another, the 
Court could disrupt the many anticompetitive practices that dot American 
elections: bipartisan gerrymanders that insulate both parties’ incumbents 
from serious challenges, ballot access rules that make it difficult for third 
parties to vie for office, nonpartisan races that deprive voters of their most 
useful cue, and so on. These examples hint that the Court’s project might be 
more successful if it shifted focus from institutional relations to the fostering 
of competition. Most aspects of governmental structure do not move the 
accountability needle, while closer elections both have an impact and can be 
encouraged by the Court.29 
More drastic measures are possible as well. One understandable 
response to the Court’s mistakes is to argue that it should get out of the 
functionalism game altogether. If it cannot predict with any certainty 
whether its chosen democratic value will be furthered by its intervention, 
perhaps it simply should not intervene on this basis. Perhaps, that is, it should 
stick to more conventional modalities: text, history, precedent, and the like. 
A different response, to which I am more partial, is to suggest that the 
problem might be with the particular value endorsed by the Court. Other 
values, like participation, deliberation, or congruence with voters’ 
preferences, might be more amenable to judicial cultivation.30 If this is the 
case, then there is no need for the Court to abandon its democratic mission. 
The mission just needs to be revised to be more feasible.31 
 
 28 See infra Section IV.A. 
 29 See infra Section IV.B. 
 30 For an article-length defense of judicial intervention based on congruence with the median voter’s 
preferences, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014). 
 31 See infra Section IV.C. 
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The Article takes the following route. First, in Part I, I elaborate on the 
concept of accountability. I identify the elements that are necessary for 
retrospective voting to occur, and contrast electoral accountability and 
retrospective voting with their alternatives. Next, in Part II, I explicate the 
Court’s accountability claims. They involve the President’s power to remove 
agency heads, Congress’s delegation to agencies, the federal 
commandeering of state governments, and the regulation of campaign 
spending. Part III is then the Article’s empirical core. In it, I present the 
political science evidence that rebuts the Court’s assertions, proceeding in 
order through all four conditions for retrospective voting. I also highlight the 
minority of studies that lend some tentative support to the Court’s analysis. 
Finally, in Part IV, I address some of the intriguing issues implicated by the 
preceding discussion: why the Court errs so profoundly, how the Court could 
promote accountability more effectively, and whether the Court should 
intervene on other, more defensible grounds. 
I also note at the outset that I am not the first to notice—or even to 
criticize—the Court’s accountability claims. Several other scholars have 
done so, typically asserting that accountability is an unappealing value32 or 
that it cannot be achieved through elections.33 My contributions, then, are to 
reveal the full range of the Court’s claims, to parse retrospective voting into 
its constituent elements, to shift the academic discussion from normative 
argument to empirical assessment, and to advance a more nuanced thesis, 
skeptical, but not wholly dismissive, of the Court’s reasoning. These are 
crucial points that have been largely overlooked by the existing literature. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Jerry Mashaw has described accountability as “a protean concept, a 
placeholder for multiple contemporary anxieties.”34 Similarly, Jane Schacter 
has observed that “[a]ccountability is . . . strikingly undertheorized” and 
implored “scholars [to] focus more precisely on the meaning of 
 
 32 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462–64 (2003); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, 
and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (1998). 
 33 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, 
and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH : THE ROLE OF 
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45, 46 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); 
Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2009). 
 34 Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES  115, 115 (Michael 
W. Dowdle ed., 2006). 
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accountability.”35 I concur both that accountability is often conflated with 
other ideas and that it is important to define it as carefully as possible. In this 
Part, I therefore concentrate on definitional matters, reserving my critique of 
the Court’s accountability claims for the balance of the Article. 
I begin by specifying the electoral form of accountability that is my 
subject here. Electoral accountability exists when voters reward elected 
officials for good records by voting for them, and punish officials for bad 
records by voting against them. It relies on the mechanism of retrospective 
voting, which in turn makes a series of demands of voters: that they know 
about incumbents’ records, that they form judgments about these records, 
that they attribute responsibility for the records, and that they vote based on 
these judgments and attributions. Next, I compare electoral accountability to 
other variants—managerial, legal, professional, and so on—that are beyond 
this Article’s scope. Lastly, I distinguish retrospective voting from other 
ways in which voters may choose to cast their ballots: prospectively, 
spatially, demographically, and the like. These other voting modes are very 
much this Article’s business because, to the extent they are employed, 
retrospective voting is not. 
A. Retrospective Voting 
Accountability is, at its core, a relational concept. It contemplates two 
parties, one of whom acts on the other’s behalf.36 It also requires that the 
party on whose behalf the other party acts be able to reward the acting party 
for good performance and punish it for bad performance. In this way, the 
acting party can be held accountable for its actions by the party for whom 
the actions are taken. As James Fearon has put it, 
We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are 
met. First, there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on 
 
 35 Jane S. Schacter, Accounting for Accountability in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 
2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2–3 (2002); see also RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO 
ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 5 (2003) (describing accountability as “highly 
controversial,” “the subject of considerable political conflict,” and “unclear and contested”); M. Elizabeth 
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1180 (2000) 
(“Commentators uniformly praise [accountability]. Unfortunately, it is not exactly clear what they are 
praising.”). 
 36 These parties can be specified in economic terms: the principal on whose behalf the agent acts. 
See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 
185–86 (2014). But see Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in 
World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 32 (2005) (pointing out some limits of the principal-agent 
model when applied to political representation). 
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behalf of B. Second, B is empowered . . . to sanction or reward A for her 
activities or performance in this capacity.37 
With this general definition in mind, it is easy to identify the distinctive 
aspects of electoral accountability. Voters are the ones on whose behalf 
actions are taken. Elected officials are the ones who take these actions. And 
the ballot is the indispensable tool that voters use to hold officeholders 
accountable. Voters vote for incumbents whose records they approve of, and 
against incumbents whose records they dislike.38 
In the literature on electoral accountability, voters are typically thought 
to hold elected officials accountable for overall policy outcomes: poverty or 
prosperity, crime or safety, war or peace, and so on.39 But there is no reason 
why officeholders cannot also be held accountable for their specific policy 
stances—or for anything else, for that matter. Voters are sovereign actors, 
and it is their prerogative to appraise incumbents’ records as they wish.40 The 
literature also tends to stress voting to the exclusion of all other steps that 
voters might take.41 But while the ballot is the essential device through which 
 
 37 James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types 
Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55, 
55 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); see also, e.g., Rubin, supra note 33, at 2073 (“Accountability can 
be roughly defined as the ability of one actor . . . to reward or punish [a] second actor on the basis of its 
performance or its explanation.”). Other scholars define accountability in more elaborate terms, 
highlighting each aspect of the relationship between the parties. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 63 (2001) (defining accountability in terms of four questions: “Who will 
decide what results are to be produced?,” “Who is accountable for producing these results?,” “Who is 
responsible for implementing the accountability process?,” and “How will that accountability process 
work?”); Mashaw, supra note 34, at 118 (considering “who is liable or accountable to whom; what they 
are liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what 
standards the putatively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding 
that those standards have been breached”). 
 38 For similar conceptions of electoral accountability, see Bernard Manin et al., Elections and 
Representation, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 37, at 40 
(“Governments are ‘accountable’ if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest 
and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the best interest of citizens win 
reelection and those who do not lose them.”); David Samuels, Presidentialism and Accountability for the 
Economy in Comparative Perspective, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 425, 426 (2004) (“[E]lectoral accountability 
occurs because voters retrospectively judge whether governments have acted in their best interests and 
then reward or sanction them appropriately.”). 
 39 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 8 
(1981) (“The traditional theory of retrospective voting implicitly assumes that citizens are more 
concerned about actual outcomes than about the particular means of achieving those outcomes, that 
citizens care about results rather than the policies that produce those results . . . .”). 
 40 E.g., Paul M. Sniderman et al., Information and Electoral Choice, in INFORMATION AND 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 117, 118 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (“Voters may 
focus on many or few aspects of the incumbent’s record, interpreting the notion of a record broadly or 
narrowly.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Does Economics Still Matter? Econometrics and the Vote, 68 J. 
POL. 208, 208 (2006) (commenting that while “[i]n this literature, there are two standard dependent 
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voters reward or punish elected officials, voter approval serves a similar 
function in periods before and after elections. Officeholders with high 
approval ratings usually govern more effectively than their less popular 
peers.42 
Its proponents deem electoral accountability desirable for two 
complementary reasons. First, it enables voters to oust elected officials who 
have performed poorly. The quality of governance presumably improves 
when these officials are removed from office.43 Second, it incentivizes 
incumbents to produce strong records so they will not lose their reelection 
bids. Incumbents know they will be judged based on how they have done, 
and thus are motivated to do well. This motivation, of course, is exactly what 
voters want from their representatives.44 
Scholars frequently confuse electoral accountability with other 
democratic values,45 but their meanings are distinct. For instance, 
accountability is not synonymous with the holding of free and fair elections. 
If voters do not vote retrospectively, then these elections do not result in 
accountability. Likewise, elected officials can be accountable to voters 
without being responsive to their preferences. This situation arises if voters 
do vote retrospectively—but based on criteria other than whether their 
representatives share their views.46 
 
variables, popularity or vote,” “vote is generally preferred because . . . ‘political behavior’ is ‘the ultimate 
dependent variable in our theoretical scheme’”). 
 42 See Jeffrey E. Cohen & James D. King, Relative Unemployment and Gubernatorial Popularity, 
66 J. POL. 1267, 1267 (2004) (“Job approval also provides a mechanism for the public to hold 
[officeholders] accountable.”). Strictly speaking, accountability through voter approval is not electoral 
accountability since it does not rely on the ballot. 
 43 See, e.g., Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government, 
94 AM. ECON. REV. 1034, 1049 (2004) (observing that electoral accountability “allows voters to remove 
officials whose interests appear to be noncongruent with the electorate”). 
 44 See, e.g., Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 189 (“[B]ecause an incumbent agent knows that 
her principals will assess her fitness for continuation in office (or other rewards) based on her 
performance, she will make better choices than she would otherwise.”). 
 45 E.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 533 (conflating “political accountability” with “the requirement that 
public officials stand periodically for election”); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political 
Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615 (2002) (conflating “accountability” with “responsiveness”); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 65 (2008) 
(treating “the closely related concepts of political accountability and political representativeness as 
synonymous”). 
 46 See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 322 n.160 (“[V]oters may well want to hold 
representatives accountable for more than their voting records. Constituent service, seniority, good 
character, and many other factors also may play into voters’ decisions.”). 
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As this discussion suggests, retrospective voting is the key prerequisite 
for electoral accountability.47 Retrospective voting is simply voting based on 
the records accrued by incumbents while in office. If these records are strong, 
voters cast their ballots for the incumbents; if they are weak, voters throw 
their support to the challengers.48 Retrospective voting, in turn, occurs only 
if four conditions are satisfied. These conditions are necessary and sufficient, 
meaning that if they are present, retrospective voting and electoral 
accountability ensue, but if they are absent, these values cannot be realized.49 
First, voters must know about incumbents’ records while in office. 
(Again, records can mean overall policy outcomes, specific policy stances, 
or any other aspects of prior performance that voters deem relevant.50) 
Retrospective knowledge is what makes retrospective voting possible in the 
first place; without it, voters lack the necessary information to cast their 
ballots based on past developments.51 And actual knowledge is generally 
required, not mere reliance on informational cues or shortcuts.52 Partisan 
affiliation, for example, is a valuable prompt for other types of voting, but it 
does not tell voters, specifically, what incumbents have done. Likewise, 
interest group endorsements can substitute for actual knowledge only to the 
extent they are based on prior events rather than prospective factors. 
Second, voters must form judgments about officeholders’ records. In 
other words, they must appraise the records and decide whether, in their 
view, the records are strong or weak. This appraisal is ultimately subjective, 
as there is no intrinsically right or wrong way to evaluate officeholders’ 
performances. However, the more detached the appraisal is from objective 
indicators, the more erratic (and the less attractive) retrospective voting 
becomes. In the extreme case, if voters’ assessments are entirely unrelated to 
 
 47 See, e.g., Seok-ju Cho, Retrospective Voting and Political Representation, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 276, 
276 (2009) (“The classic idea of accountability is related to retrospective voting: voters reject a badly 
behaved incumbent and retain a well-behaved one.”). 
 48 See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 39, at 6–11; James E. Campbell et al., The Theory of Conditional 
Retrospective Voting: Does the Presidential Record Matter Less in Open-Seat Elections?, 72 J. POL. 
1083, 1083 (2010) (“The theory of retrospective voting is that voters base their votes on their perceptions 
of the past performance of the parties and candidates in governing.”). 
 49 For similar lists of conditions for retrospective voting, see Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2004), and Staszewski, supra note 33, at 1266. 
 50 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 51 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the 
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999) (“Before the public can hold elected 
representatives responsible for decisions, they must know the substance of the policy adopted.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 49, at 1320 (“[I]nformation shortcuts, while certainly useful, cannot 
provide an adequate substitute for basic factual knowledge about politics.”). 
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real-world evidence, this evidence loses its ability to drive voters’ 
decisions.53 
Third, voters must attribute responsibility for the records. That is, they 
must determine whom to credit or blame for the performances they have 
observed and appraised. Accurate attribution is easy when the records at 
issue are incumbents’ own policy stances. Plainly, incumbents are 
responsible for the positions they have chosen to take. But correct attribution 
is more difficult when the relevant records are overall policy outcomes. In 
this case, voters must decide how much credit or blame each elected official 
is due for conditions that are partly the government’s doing and partly the 
product of many other factors.54 
And fourth, voters must actually vote on the basis of their judgments 
and attributions. They must support officeholders whom they credit for 
outcomes they regard as good, and oppose officeholders whom they blame 
for results they see as bad. Similarly, they must vote for incumbents whose 
policy stances they favor, and against incumbents whose positions they 
dislike. Only in this way do the earlier stages in the causal sequence 
ultimately bear fruit. If voters take the trouble to learn, to appraise, and to 
attribute—but then cast their ballots on other grounds—there is no 
retrospective voting, and hence no electoral accountability.55 
As this analysis is fairly abstract, a graphical illustration may be helpful. 
Take the state of the economy, which is by far the most studied variable in 
 
 53 See, e.g., Christopher J. Anderson, The End of Economic Voting?: Contingency Dilemmas and the 
Limits of Democratic Accountability, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 271, 279 (2007) (observing that in most 
models of retrospective voting, “the translation process requires that this objective economy is perceived 
by voters and perceived somewhat accurately”). 
 54 See, e.g., Thomas J. Rudolph, The Meaning and Measurement of Responsibility Attributions, 
44 AM. POL. RES. 106, 107 (2016) (explaining that “attributional judgments in politics are comprised of 
two complementary but distinct considerations,” namely “how much responsibility does an actor or 
institution bear for a particular outcome” and “[h]ow much responsibility does an actor bear . . . compared 
with other relevant actors”). Note that by requiring reasonable evaluations of incumbents’ records and 
accurate attributions of responsibility for them, I am articulating requirements for a normatively 
appealing form of retrospective voting. A distorted form of retrospective voting occurs if voters 
unreasonably assess incumbents’ records or incorrectly assign responsibility for them. 
 55 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 53, at 279 (pointing out that “[t]he next step in the chain of 
necessary events,” “that these evaluations translate into a vote for or against the government,” is not 
always satisfied). My inclusion of this fourth condition means I am deliberately conflating the possibility 
of accountability (captured by the first three conditions) with its reality. Officeholders may be held 
accountable if the first three conditions are satisfied, while they are held accountable if the fourth 
condition is met as well. Though the Supreme Court’s language is hard to parse, see infra Part II, it is 
plausible that some of its claims involve potential rather than actual accountability. To the extent the 
claims are construed this way, only evidence about the first three conditions is relevant to them. It is 
immaterial, on this account, whether voters in fact choose to vote retrospectively and thus to hold 
officeholders to account. 
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the accountability literature.56 Assume also that voters (1) are accurately 
informed about this state, (2) assess the state reasonably (so that a good 
economy produces a good evaluation and vice versa), (3) attribute 
responsibility for the state to the President, and (4) vote on this basis. Then, 
as shown in Figure 1, Scenario 1, there is a strong and steeply sloped 
relationship between voters’ appraisal of the economy and the probability 
they will vote for the President. This relationship reveals that the President 
is highly accountable for the economy’s condition. When it is weak, voters 
are much less likely to vote for her. But when it is strong, she is much more 
apt to win their support. 
Now assume that while voters still know about the economy’s state and 
assess it reasonably, they attribute responsibility for it to the vagaries of the 
stock market, not the President. (This means the third condition for 
retrospective voting is not satisfied, but the point holds no matter which 
criterion is unmet.) In this case, displayed in Figure 1, Scenario 2, there is a 
weak and flat relationship between voters’ appraisal of the economy and the 
probability they will vote for the President. This link indicates that the 
President is mostly unaccountable for the economy’s condition. As it varies 
from weak to strong, voters become only slightly more likely to cast their 
ballots for her. 
Figure 1 can be generalized beyond this example, of course. The y-axis 
can represent any kind of support that voters might give to incumbents: not 
just their votes but also their dollars, their time, or their positive responses to 
opinion surveys.57 Likewise, the x-axis can capture voters’ evaluations of any 
aspects of incumbents’ records, or even the records themselves. And the 
curves that plot the relationships between voters’ support and their 
evaluations can depict the impact of almost anything on accountability: 
levels of voter knowledge, types of institutional arrangements, modes of 
voting, and so on. Again, a steeper slope is the telltale sign of higher 
accountability, while a flatter line denotes the opposite.58 
 
 56 See, e.g., Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 120, 121 (2008) (noting that “economic performance” is “the focus of 
almost every other study on [retrospective voting]”). 
 57 And even with respect to votes, the y-axis can represent voters’ own voting intentions, the 
incumbent party’s vote share, that party’s seat share, or whether that party remains in control of the 
government. See David Samuels & Timothy Hellwig, Elections and Accountability for the Economy: A 
Conceptual and Empirical Reassessment, 20 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 393, 396 (2010) 
(pointing out “the range of observable measures of electoral accountability”). 
 58 In slightly more technical terms, suppose we are interested in determining the effect of some 
variable on accountability. The key is to interact this variable with voters’ evaluations, in a model in 
which voters’ support is the dependent variable. The coefficient of the interaction term then reveals the 
variable’s impact on accountability. See, e.g., Robert Johns, Credit Where It’s Due?: Valence Politics, 
112:989 (2018) Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law 
1005 



















B. Other Forms of Accountability 
Some of these extensions of Figure 1 start to implicate non-electoral 
forms of accountability. For instance, voters’ approval of officeholders is 
closely related to their voting for officeholders, but it is not the same thing. 
Voters can express approval (or disapproval) at any time, not just when an 
election is held. Voters’ sentiments also have less drastic consequences for 
incumbents than actual election results. The former merely enhance or 
undermine incumbents’ effectiveness, while the latter either keep them in 
office or oust them from it.59 
Other voter actions that reward (or punish) officeholders, like 
contributing (or not contributing) money to them or joining (or not joining) 
their campaigns, are even further removed from the ballot. Crucially, all 
voters vote, by definition, and can express their feelings in surveys, but only 
a small subset donate their funds or time to candidates.60 Nevertheless, it is 
 
Attributions of Responsibility, and Multi-Level Elections, 33 POL. BEHAV. 53, 68 (2011) (commenting 
that “[t]his is the stock approach to inferring the relevance of an issue in vote choice”). 
 59 See, e.g., Samuels & Hellwig, supra note 57, at 395 (noting that “[p]oliticians might take note of 
the general thrust of voters’ expressed opinion, but they also might ignore these signals altogether”). 
 60 For a discussion of the unrepresentativeness of campaign donors, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1474–75 (2015). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1006 
perfectly coherent to speak of incumbents’ accountability to donors or to 
activists. These are simply non-electoral kinds of accountability, through 
acts other than voting, to certain groups of voters rather than the electorate 
as a whole.61 
Many elected officials are also accountable to other politicians. Within 
parties’ legislative caucuses, in particular, rank-and-file members are 
rewarded by their leadership for good behavior (like toeing the party line) 
and punished for bad conduct (like undercutting party unity) through 
committee assignments, campaign contributions, and other tools.62 This sort 
of managerial accountability is even more important for unelected public 
officials—that is, bureaucrats. Bureaucracies are hierarchical organizations 
in which inferiors are accountable in many ways to their superiors for their 
records. Supervisors can praise or criticize their subordinates, give them 
better or worse work, promote or demote them, and so on. As Edward Rubin 
has observed, this is a much richer array of accountability devices than the 
ballot to which voters are limited.63 
Still another variant worth noting is legal accountability. This is the 
accountability of officeholders (and everybody else) not to a concrete 
counterparty but rather to the law itself. Officeholders (and all other persons) 
are subject to fines, imprisonment, and other penalties when they transgress 
legal norms. In the words of Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, “agents [must] 
abide by formal rules and be prepared to justify their actions in those terms, 
in courts or quasi-judicial arenas.”64 
More could be said about these non-electoral types of accountability, 
which raise many interesting issues. But I flag these types only to bracket 
them. Almost all of the Supreme Court’s claims involve accountability via 
voting rather than through any other mechanism.65 I therefore turn next from 
 
 61 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 35, at 10 (discussing officeholders’ accountability to groups that 
can offer “substantial campaign contributions . . . and other political resources”). 
 62 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 34, at 121 (observing that “political accountability includes . . . a 
host of other political processes in which elected officials hold their fellows . . . accountable for their 
actions based on essentially political criteria”). 
 63 See Rubin, supra note 33, at 2134 (discussing “how fully the concept of accountability is tied into 
an administrative hierarchy and requires the sort of continuous, intensive interaction between superior 
and subordinate that is characteristic of this hierarchy”); see also BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING 
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 209 (3d ed. 1998) (covering “an awesome armada of 
policies, mechanisms, and processes for overseeing government bureaucracies”). 
 64 Grant & Keohane, supra note 36, at 36; see also Helene V. Smookler, Accountability of Public 
Officials in the United States, in PUBLIC SERVICE ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39, 
41 (Joseph G. Jabbra & O.P. Dwivedi eds., 1989) (“[A]gencies are also legally accountable to the courts 
for the administrative observance of statutes and constitutionally granted rights and liberties . . . .”). 
 65 A handful of Court decisions address interbranch rather than electoral accountability. See, e.g., 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 773 (1982) (discussing impeachment as a form of “accountability to 
the other branches”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
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alternatives to electoral accountability to alternatives to retrospective voting. 
These other voting modes are highly relevant here because the more they are 
used, the less persuasive the Court’s claims become. 
C. Other Forms of Voting 
Prospective voting—voting based on candidates’ expected future 
records66—is the obvious antithesis of retrospective voting. Prospective 
voting differs starkly from retrospective voting in its orientation toward the 
future rather than the past. More subtly, it differs in the demands it makes of 
voters. It requires them to assess all candidates, not just the incumbent, 
before choosing for whom to cast their ballots.67 These contrasts, though, 
should not be overstated. As Morris Fiorina has explained, voters’ 
evaluations of incumbents’ past records are key drivers of their expectations 
of incumbents’ future performances.68 Prospective voting is thus intertwined, 
at least partly, with retrospective voting. 
Closely tied to prospective voting is spatial voting, or voting for the 
most ideologically proximate candidate. To vote in this way, a voter must 
first ascertain her own ideology as well as those of all candidates in the race, 
typically on a single left-right continuum. The voter must then vote for the 
candidate who is ideologically closest to her own position. Spatial voting 
resembles prospective voting in its future orientation and consideration of all 
candidates. It is distinct, though, in its exclusive focus on ideological 
distance. This may be one of the factors that a prospective voter takes into 
account, but it is the entirety of the decision-making process for a spatial 
voter.69 
Another, even simpler approach in the same family is partisan voting, 
or voting for the candidate who shares the voter’s partisan affiliation. This 
approach, the so-called “Michigan model” of voting, is based on the 
 
legislative veto as a tool through which “Congress secures the accountability of executive and 
independent agencies”). 
 66 As in the retrospective voting context, records can refer to overall policy outcomes, specific policy 
stances, or any other aspects of candidate performance that voters deem relevant. See supra notes 39–40 
and accompanying text. 
 67 See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 1083 (“Unlike prospective voting, which requires the 
electorate to know, evaluate, and contrast the sometimes complex or ambiguous positions of the parties 
and candidates, retrospective voting requires relatively little of voters.”). 
 68 See FIORINA, supra note 39, at 200 (“Retrospective judgments have direct impacts on the formation 
of future expectations and on party identification, and through these factors, indirect influences on the 
vote.”). 
 69 For illuminating discussions of spatial voting, see Stephen A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 
Presidential Election, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 59–63 (2009), and Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski, 
Ideology and the US Congressional Vote, POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 1, 1–19 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2650028 [https://perma.cc/V9NL-AGQK]. 
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centrality of partisanship for many voters.70 Partisanship, on this account, is 
the “unmoved mover” that enables voters to make sense of a complicated 
political world and to feel as if they are part of a political team.71 To be sure, 
Michigan modelers acknowledge that partisan affiliation can change over 
time as voters update their “running tally” of parties’ successes and failures.72 
Nevertheless, these scholars view partisan affiliation as a highly durable 
attribute that, in most circumstances, translates directly into votes. 
Still another mode of voting might be termed demographic: voting for 
the candidate who shares the voter’s race, ethnicity, gender, or other defining 
characteristic. Demographic voting underpins the Supreme Court’s case law 
construing the Voting Rights Act; racial cohesion must be shown, for both 
minority and majority voters, to establish a violation of the Act.73 In the 
Court’s view, demographic voting is also quite common: “Because both 
minority and majority voters often select members of their own race as their 
preferred representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black candidate 
is the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is the choice of whites.”74 
A final option is valence voting based on candidate qualities that are 
intrinsically appealing but unrelated to public policy. These valence qualities 
include good looks, charisma, a winning personality, and the like. When 
voters cast their ballots in reliance on these qualities, they disregard 
ideological and partisan factors. Instead, their choices are driven by the 
degree to which candidates exhibit personal traits that voters find attractive.75 
Again, the key point about these voting modes is that they are 
fundamentally different from retrospective voting based on incumbents’ 
records. When voters vote in these ways, their attention is not on the past 
alone and extends to all candidates in the race. Arguments built on the 
assumption of retrospective voting thus founder to the extent this premise 
fails to capture actual voter behavior. It should also be stressed that the voting 
modes are not exclusive. That is, voters do not vote in one way, in perfect 
 
 70 The definitive work setting forth this approach remains ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN 
VOTER (Midway reprt. 1980). Cf. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Why Are American Presidential 
Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 409, 419 
(1993) (referring to “the social-psychological models connected with the Michigan School”). 
 71 MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 134–36 (2008). 
 72 FIORINA, supra note 39, at 85–86. 
 73 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) (requiring showings that “the minority group . . . 
is politically cohesive” and that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc”). 
 74 Id. at 68. In the political science literature, the canonical work on demographic voting, which gave 
rise to the so-called “Columbia model,” is PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW 
THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (2d ed. 1948). 
 75 For a good discussion of valence voting, distinguishing between “character valence” and 
“campaign valence” traits, see Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence and Ideological 
Positions in U.S. House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 371, 371–74 (2010). 
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consistency with a single theory of voting, but rather for a messy mix of 
reasons that stem from multiple models at once.76 It is therefore unlikely that 
retrospective voting plays no role in voters’ decision-making. Instead, the 
crucial question is how much of a role it plays—how its influence compares 
to those of other forms of voting. That is one of the issues I address below in 
the Article’s empirical section.77 
II. ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE COURT 
Before getting to the empirics, though, I pinpoint the claims about 
electoral accountability made by the Supreme Court. These claims involve 
four distinct issues: (1) the President’s degree of control over administrative 
agencies, (2) the degree of congressional delegation to agencies, (3) the 
extent to which state governments are commandeered by the federal 
government, and (4) the amount of money in politics. The first three of the 
claims apply primarily to the third condition for retrospective voting: voters’ 
attribution of responsibility for incumbents’ records. In contrast, the 
campaign finance claim relates mostly to the first condition: voters’ 
knowledge of these records. 
I note that I consider accountability claims in opinions both by Court 
majorities and by individual Justices (though I prioritize the former over the 
latter). I also note that I cover only what I deem to be the most common 
accountability claims in the case law. I do not comment on certain one-off 
arguments made by individual Justices,78 nor do I evaluate assertions that 
particular doctrinal rules are required by particular actors’ greater or lesser 
accountability.79 A last proviso: In all of the cases I examine, the Court 
 
 76 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 35, at 14 (doubting that “we could persuasively conceive of elections 
as all selection or all sanction” and suggesting that “[p]erhaps some combination of selection and sanction 
characterize [sic] most elections”). 
 77 See infra Part III. 
 78 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (claiming that accountability is diminished “by passing off a Government operation [Amtrak] 
as an independent private concern”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 361 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that accountability is diminished when, due to partisan gerrymandering, “voters find it far more 
difficult to remove those responsible for a government they do not want”); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 
531 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (claiming that accountability is diminished when political patronage 
is prohibited because its ban weakens parties and so “limits the ability of the electorate to choose wisely 
among candidates”). 
 79 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (justifying 
judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes on the ground that “[w]hile agencies 
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(justifying judicial deference to changes in agency policies on the ground that “people casting their votes 
is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
programs and regulations”). These are assertions about what doctrinal consequences should follow if 
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justifies its conclusions partly on the basis of its accountability claims and 
partly on other grounds. These other grounds are beyond the scope of this 
project, and so are omitted from the discussion that follows. 
A. The President 
Beginning with the President, the Court contends that she is more 
electorally accountable for an agency’s actions when she exercises more 
control over the agency. The removal power—the President’s authority to 
dismiss an agency official—is the principal method of control addressed by 
the Court’s decisions. The same logic, though, applies to other means of 
control such as the appointment power (the President’s authority to select 
agency staff)80 and the directive power (the President’s authority to instruct 
them what to do).81 Under this logic, restrictions on the President’s control 
over an agency are disfavored because they reduce the President’s 
accountability for the agency’s actions. In fact, such restrictions are 
sometimes unconstitutional, a violation of the democratic principles 
embodied in the separation of powers. 
The Court articulated this claim most clearly in the 2010 case of Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.82 At issue 
was a two-level protection from removal for the members of the Board, an 
entity created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.83 The Board members 
could be dismissed only for good cause by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Commissioners, in turn, could be dismissed only for 
good cause by the President.84 Two layers of removal restrictions thus 
separated the President from the Board members.85 
According to the Court, this arrangement unlawfully eroded the 
President’s accountability for the Board’s actions. The dual removal 
restraints broke the “clear and effective chain of command” and the “‘chain 
of dependence’” on which voters rely to “determine on whom the blame or 
 
certain actors are more or less accountable. They are not claims about what increases or decreases 
accountability in the first place. 
 80 See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (observing that if the President “has no control over the 
appointment of inferior officers,” she “may have less incentive to care about such appointments”). 
 81 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2298–99 (2001) 
(noting that President Bill Clinton’s more extensive use of the directive power changed “norms of 
accountability”). 
 82 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 83 Id. at 484. 
 84 Id. at 486–87. 
 85 See id. at 484, 486–87. 
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the punishment [for] a pernicious measure . . . ought really to fall.”86 The 
restraints therefore “subvert[ed] . . . the public’s ability to pass judgment on 
[the President’s] efforts” and rendered the President “not . . . fully 
accountable for discharging his own responsibilities.”87 Now “the buck 
would stop somewhere else,” “greatly diminish[ing] the intended and 
necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate.”88 
Justice Antonin Scalia made the same argument in his renowned 1988 
dissent in Morrison v. Olson.89 He commented that, ordinarily, when the 
President can dismiss federal prosecutors at will, “the President pays the cost 
in political damage to his administration” if prosecutors abuse their 
authority.90 “[T]he unfairness” of the prosecutors’ conduct “will come home 
to roost in the Oval Office.”91 However, a provision limiting to good cause 
the Attorney General’s ability to remove an independent counsel meant that 
“a process is set in motion that is not in the full control of persons ‘dependent 
on the people,’ and whose flaws cannot be blamed on the President.”92 
“[E]ven if it were entirely evident” that the counsel had behaved badly, 
“there would be no one accountable to the public to whom the blame could 
be assigned.”93 
More implicitly, in cases not involving restrictions on the President’s 
removal power, Justices have assumed that the President wields more (less) 
control over executive (independent) agencies, and so is more (less) 
accountable for their actions. In a 1991 case, the Court stated that “Cabinet-
level departments” are “subject to the exercise of political oversight” by the 
President, and thus “share the President’s accountability to the people.”94 In 
a 2000 dissent, similarly, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that “politically 
elected officials . . . must (and will)” be held “politically accountable” for 
“important, conspicuous, and controversial” decisions by the Food and Drug 
Administration (an executive agency).95 Conversely, Justice Breyer asserted 
 
 86 Id. at 498 (citation omitted); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 131–32 (1926) (also 
discussing this “‘chain of dependence’” and asking, if the President cannot remove a subordinate at will, 
“where is the responsibility?”). 
 87 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 498, 514 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 476 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
 88 Id. at 514 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 478). 
 89 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 90 Id. at 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. at 729; see also id. at 729, 731 (stating that “[t]he people know whom to blame” and “the blame 
can be assigned to someone who can be punished” when prosecutors are removable at will by the 
President). 
 92 Id. at 729. 
 93 Id. at 731 (emphasis omitted). 
 94 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991). 
 95 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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in 2009 that the Federal Communications Commission (an independent 
agency) is “insulate[d] . . . from ‘the exercise of political oversight,’” is “not 
directly responsible to the voters,” and so possesses a “comparative freedom 
from ballot-box control.”96 Likewise, Justice Scalia opined in 1991 that the 
“congressional restriction upon arbitrary dismissal of the heads of 
[independent] agencies” makes “such agencies less accountable to [the 
President], and hence he less responsible for them.”97 
This claim—that the President’s accountability for an agency’s actions 
stems from her control over the agency—is based on voters’ attributions of 
responsibility. The idea is that the more control the President actually has 
over an agency, the more control she is perceived as having. Voters therefore 
become more likely to credit the President for agency actions they support, 
and to blame her for agency actions they oppose, as her sway over the agency 
rises. In contrast, voters are less apt to see the President as responsible for 
the policies of an agency that is further outside her influence. As Alex Ruder 
has summarized the argument, “presidential control over agencies promotes 
the value of greater political accountability by increasing institutional clarity 
of responsibility.”98 
But while the third condition for retrospective voting is the one most 
directly implicated here, it is important to recognize that the Court’s claim 
also depends on the satisfaction of the other criteria. The President cannot be 
held accountable for agency actions that voters do not know about. Nor can 
she be held accountable for actions as to which voters have reached no 
normative judgments. And nor is there presidential accountability if voters 
ultimately cast their ballots on grounds other than their judgments of, and 
attributions for, agency policies. These are simply the implications of the 
retrospective voting conditions being necessary and sufficient. If any of them 
is unmet, voters do not vote retrospectively and the President is neither 
rewarded nor punished for agency performance.99 
It is also necessary to acknowledge that the Court sometimes phrases 
its claim in a subtly—but substantively—different way. Under this variant, 
the point is not that greater presidential control over an agency produces 
greater presidential accountability. Rather, it is that because the President is 
 
 96 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 921 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 98 Alex I. Ruder, Institutional Design and the Attribution of Presidential Control: Insulating the 
President from Blame, 9 Q.J. POL. SCI. 301, 331 (2014); see also Kagan, supra note 81, at 2323 n.306 
(“[I]f the President can remove an official, the public will hold him accountable for that official’s 
decisions.”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
1133, 1149 (2014) (“[A] unitary executive removes some ambiguity surrounding the ‘author’ of the 
administrative actions . . . and hence allows [voters] to reward or punish government performance.”). 
 99 See supra Section I.A. 
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elected by voters, and thus accountable to them, she should have plenary 
authority over the entire executive branch.100 Stated like this, the argument is 
above all one about democratic legitimacy, not about the drivers of 
presidential accountability. In this form, the argument also cannot be 
empirically validated or refuted; plainly, the President is elected, agency 
officials are not, and certain normative conclusions may or may not follow 
from these facts.101 Because my subject here is the empirical (not the 
normative) soundness of the Court’s reasoning, I do not further discuss this 
version of the claim. Its cogency does not hinge on any of the political 
science evidence I present below. 
B. Congress 
Moving from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other, certain 
Justices maintain that Congress is more electorally accountable for decisions 
it does not delegate to agencies but rather makes itself. When agencies act 
pursuant to congressional authorization, these Justices believe that voters are 
unlikely to reward or punish legislators for the actions. But when the actions 
are taken directly by Congress, in these Justices’ view, they are more apt to 
result in political gains or losses for legislators. This alleged rise in 
accountability is one reason why the nondelegation doctrine nominally 
remains good law, in theory barring Congress from assigning certain policy 
choices to agencies. 
Then-Justice William Rehnquist asserted this claim most forcefully in 
a 1980 case involving the setting of a benzene exposure limit by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.102 He wrote that “the 
nondelegation doctrine serves three important functions,” one of which is 
that “it ensures . . . that important choices of social policy are made by 
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular 
 
 100 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010) 
(“The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives 
him the power to do so. That power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those who assist 
him in carrying out his duties.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926) (arguing that because 
“the President [is] elected by all the people,” “there would seem to be no reason for construing [the 
Constitution] in such a way as to limit and hamper [the President’s executive] power”). Still another 
variant of the claim (which I also do not address) is that when the President has less control over an 
agency, the agency is less managerially accountable to the President. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 
496 (commenting that the President’s “ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates 
accountable for their conduct—is impaired” by the dual removal restraints). 
 101 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case 
of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 196 (1995) (“[I]f one simply defines 
‘accountability’ as the vesting of ultimate decisional authority in a person who is elected, not appointed, 
it is, indeed, self-evident that the President is elected, and bureaucrats are not.”). 
 102 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980). 
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will,” not by “politically unresponsive administrators.”103 He added that “[i]t 
is the hard choices, and not the filling in of the blanks, which must be made 
by the elected representatives of the people.”104 “When fundamental policy 
decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted are to be 
made, the buck stops with Congress . . . .”105 
Justice John Marshall Harlan echoed this argument in a 1963 opinion, 
stating that the nondelegation doctrine “insures that the fundamental policy 
decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the 
body immediately responsible to the people.”106 So did Justice William J. 
Brennan in a 1967 concurrence, commenting that, “to the extent Congress 
delegates authority under indefinite standards, [its] policy-making function 
is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive in the same 
degree to the people.”107 And so did a Court majority in 1996, declaring that 
through its “clear assignment of power to [Congress],” the nondelegation 
doctrine “allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for 
making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to 
governance.”108 
This claim about congressional accountability, like its presidential 
analogue, centers on voters’ attributions of responsibility. Its crux is that 
when Congress authorizes agencies to decide matters, voters are less likely 
to deem legislators responsible for the ensuing decisions. Those decisions 
tend to strike voters as the handiwork of agencies, not of Congress. 
Conversely, when Congress does not delegate but rather makes policy 
choices itself, voters are more inclined to credit or blame legislators. Those 
choices cannot reasonably be attributed to any other actor. As David 
Schoenbrod has written, “when Congress delegates, its fingerprints are not 
 
 103 Id. at 685–87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 104 Id. at 687. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). 
 107 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). 
 108 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996). The idea that Congress is more accountable 
for decisions it does not delegate to agencies but rather makes itself also helps justify the so-called 
“nondelegation canon,” under which courts construe ambiguous statutes so as to preclude agency 
authority to make sweeping policy choices. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (“[W]e are confident that 
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to 
an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 329–37. 
 Additionally, concerns about diminished congressional accountability due to delegation are 
sometimes answered by pointing out that the popularly elected President is responsible for the agencies 
to whom authority has been assigned. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when Congress delegates to agencies, it “aggrandize[s] its primary 
competitor for political power, and the recipient of the policymaking authority, while not Congress itself, 
would at least be politically accountable”). 
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left on the duties imposed on the public,” and it “obscure[s] [its] 
responsibility for the eventual costs and disappointments.”109 
Also like the presidential claim, the congressional argument requires 
the rest of the conditions for retrospective voting to be satisfied too. Even if 
legislators make the hard decisions themselves, they can be held accountable 
for those decisions only if voters know about them, appraise them, and cast 
their ballots accordingly. And again as with the presidential claim, there exist 
both empirical and normative forms of the congressional argument. The 
empirical variant—the one that is my concern here—is that congressional 
delegation to agencies reduces congressional accountability. The normative 
variant is that Congress, not agencies, should make policy choices because 
Congress, not agencies, is elected by the people.110 As before, I bracket this 
assertion because political science evidence cannot confirm or rebut it. 
C. State Governments 
Turning next to state governments, the Court contends that their 
electoral accountability is lessened when they are compelled to act by the 
federal government. According to the Court, state governments can usually 
choose for themselves which policies to enact, and then can be held 
accountable for those choices by their state electorates. But this salutary state 
of affairs breaks down when federal authorities require state governments to 
take certain steps. Then state governments risk being rewarded or punished 
for decisions they did not actually make—and the federal government may 
avoid accountability for decisions it did make. For this reason (among 
others), federal commandeering of state governments is prohibited. 
The Court set forth this claim at greatest length in the 1992 case, New 
York v. United States, in which it announced the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.111 A federal statute, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 
directed states to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated 
within their borders.112 In the absence of such a law, “[w]here Congress 
 
 109 David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
731, 744 (1999); see also Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the 
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1478 (2015) (arguing that “delegation may allow members 
of Congress to avoid responsibility for difficult choices”). 
 110 For an example of an academic stating the normative argument, see Thomas W. Merrill, 
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 
2141 (2004) (“Congress . . . is the most democratically accountable political institution; hence, if we want 
policy made by actors accountable to the people, we should require that policy . . . be made by Congress 
rather than by unelected administrators.”). The empirical variant was stated most clearly by the Court in 
Loving. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 111 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 112 See id. at 149–54. 
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encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments 
remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain 
accountable to the people.”113 But “where the Federal Government compels 
States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is 
diminished.”114 “[I]t may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program 
may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”115 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the author of New York, defended the 
same proposition in a 1982 case involving federal requirements imposed on 
state utility commissions.116 Typically, “[c]itizens . . . understand that 
legislative authority . . . includes the power to decide . . . which policies to 
adopt,” and “hold their utility commissions accountable for the choices they 
make.”117 “Congressional compulsion of state agencies,” however, “blurs the 
lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their 
representatives are no longer responsive to local needs.”118 In a 1997 case 
about a federal mandate that state law enforcement officers check handgun 
buyers’ backgrounds, the Court reasoned along similar lines.119 “By forcing 
state governments to [act],” the federal government puts them “in the 
position of taking the blame for [the policy’s] burdensomeness and for its 
defects.”120 “Under the present law . . .  it will likely be the [state officer], not 
some federal official, who will be blamed for any error . . . that causes a 
purchaser to be mistakenly rejected.”121 
Outside the commandeering context, the Court has asserted that 
Congress may exercise its Spending Clause power in such a way that states 
have no choice but to comply with its preferences, thus again eroding 
accountability. In the 2012 blockbuster, National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, both the plurality and the dissenters argued that 
Congress’s threat to withhold all Medicaid funds from states that declined to 
expand their Medicaid programs amounted to unlawful compulsion.122 The 
plurality wrote that “[p]ermitting the Federal Government to force the States 
to implement a federal program would threaten the political accountability 
 
 113 Id. at 168. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 169. 
 116 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775–97 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 117 Id. at 787. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902–04 (1997). 
 120 Id. at 930. 
 121 Id. 
 122 567 U.S. 519, 541–42 (2012). 
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key to our federal system.”123 “[W]hen the State has no choice, the Federal 
Government can achieve its objectives without accountability.”124 Likewise, 
the dissenters declared that “[w]hen Congress compels the States to do its 
bidding, it blurs the lines of political accountability.”125 
This claim, that state governments’ accountability declines when they 
are forced to act (overtly or implicitly) by the federal government, both 
converges on and diverges from the arguments discussed above. It is similar 
to the presidential and congressional arguments in that it too revolves around 
voters’ attributions of responsibility. The essence of the claim is that voters 
correctly assign responsibility to state governments when these bodies are 
not federally coerced, but become unsure whom to credit or blame when they 
are effectively carrying out federal orders.126 The claim is also similar in that 
it too relies on the satisfaction of the other conditions for retrospective 
voting. Even if state governments are free from federal interference, they are 
accountable for their decisions only if voters are aware of those decisions, 
assess them, and vote on their basis. 
However, the claim is different in that it does not stray from empirical 
onto normative terrain. The Court does not assert that state governments, 
rather than the federal government, should make policy choices because they 
are popularly elected. Nor would such an assertion be sensible since the 
federal government also enjoys the legitimacy of democratic election. The 
claim is different as well in that it applies to two kinds of institutions: the 
states and the federal government. Federal compulsion of state governments 
supposedly undermines both state and federal accountability.127 Of these two 
sides to the argument, I focus below on the state aspect. It is the one that is 
 
 123 Id. at 578 (plurality opinion). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 678 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). Justice Kennedy has also invoked 
accountability in the related Commerce Clause context, contending that “[w]ere the Federal Government 
to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern . . . the boundaries between the 
spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.” 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 126 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201 (1998) (arguing that commandeering may cause voters to “hold state 
officers politically accountable for a choice that was not theirs” or to “fail to hold federal officials 
politically accountable for choices they do make”); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360–61 (2001) (“If the people cannot assign blame for an unpopular federal 
policy, because the lines of political accountability are not transparent, then the national government 
responsible for the policy has avoided internalizing the political costs of its actions.”). 
 127 For an unusual case involving state interference with federal accountability, see Cook v. Gralike, 
531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing a ballot initiative requiring Congress 
members’ opposition to term limits to be noted on the ballot because it “interfere[d] with the direct line 
of accountability between the National Legislature and the people who elect it”). 
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more prominent in the case law, more illuminated by the political science 
evidence, and more distinct from the Court’s other contentions.128 
D. Incumbents 
The Court’s final claim about electoral accountability pertains to 
incumbent politicians generally, not to any particular branch or level of 
government. It is that when campaign expenditures are unregulated, 
corporations, unions, and other groups are able to deploy more funds to 
inform voters about incumbents’ records, thus rendering incumbents more 
accountable. Conversely, when campaign spending is restricted, concerned 
entities cannot convey as much information to voters about incumbents’ 
performances, meaning that voters cannot reward or punish incumbents as 
effectively. This reasoning helps explain why expenditure limits are now 
considered a violation of the First Amendment. 
The Court voiced this claim in the landmark 2010 case, Citizens United 
v. FEC, in which it struck down the federal prohibition on independent 
expenditures by corporations and unions.129 The Court proclaimed that 
“[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people.”130 The Court then listed the ways in 
which “speech”—that is, campaign spending—allegedly promotes 
accountability. It enables voters “to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus.”131 It also enhances “the ability of the 
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates”132 as well as the 
“‘[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates.’”133 Accordingly, “political speech must prevail against laws that 
would suppress it.”134 
Justice Kennedy, the author of Citizens United, advanced the same 
argument in a 1990 case involving a state ban on corporate expenditures.135 
He wrote that the ban “prevents a nonprofit corporate speaker from using its 
 
 128 The state governmental claim also differs from the presidential and congressional arguments in 
that it is really about the distortion, not the reduction, of state governmental accountability. If state 
governments are deemed responsible for actions they were compelled to take, then they may well be held 
accountable for those actions too. But objectively, they should not be held accountable for those actions 
because they were not actually responsible for them. 
 129 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 130 Id. at 339. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976)). 
 133 Id. at 340 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14). 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990), rev’d, Citizens United, 
558 U.S. 310. 
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own funds to inform the voting public that a particular candidate has a good 
or bad voting record.”136 The ban therefore eliminates one of the 
“mechanisms for holding candidates accountable for the votes they cast” and 
perpetuates the “lack of accountability [that] is one of the major concerns of 
our time.”137 In a 2003 case, Justice Scalia objected to the prohibition that 
was later invalidated in Citizens United on similar grounds.138 “[T]his 
legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities 
most capable of giving such criticism loud voice.”139 The law thus “mute[s] 
criticism of [Congress members’] records and facilitate[s] [their] 
reelection.”140 
This claim—that limits on campaign spending reduce incumbents’ 
accountability—differs from the Court’s other assertions in that it does not 
apply to a specific institution. More importantly, the claim differs in that it 
primarily implicates the first condition for retrospective voting (voters’ 
information about incumbents’ records) rather than the third one (voters’ 
attributions of responsibility). The basic reason why campaign spending is 
thought to influence accountability is that it informs voters about 
incumbents’ performances. Advertisements, mailers, rallies, and all the other 
items paid for by the spending educate voters about the choices made by 
incumbents and those choices’ consequences. 
It is worth noting, though, that depending on how they are deployed, 
electoral outlays can affect the other retrospective voting criteria too. 
Campaign funds can be used not just to inform voters about incumbents’ 
records but also to persuade them that the records are strong or weak. 
Likewise, funds can be spent on linking incumbents to positive or negative 
developments that occurred on their watch. Funds can be devoted as well to 
convincing voters to cast their ballots retrospectively rather than on some 
other basis. So while the key function of money in politics might be 
informational, that is far from its only purpose. 
 
*          *          * 
 
 
 136 Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 137 Id. 
 138 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 139 Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 140 Id. at 262. For a similar claim that campaign finance regulation benefits incumbents and harms 
challengers, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1072 (1996) (“Campaign finance reform measures . . . insulate the 
political system from challenge by outsiders, and hinder the ability of challengers to compete on equal 
terms with those already in power.”) (footnote omitted). 
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In sum, the Supreme Court makes four kinds of claims about electoral 
accountability: (1) that the President is more accountable for an agency’s 
actions when she exercises more control over the agency, (2) that Congress 
is more accountable for decisions it does not delegate to agencies but rather 
makes itself, (3) that state governments are more accountable for their 
policies when they are not compelled to enact them by the federal 
government, and (4) that incumbents are more accountable for their records 
when campaign spending is unregulated. As is evident, all of these claims 
exhibit a common structure. Accountability is said to be higher under certain 
institutional arrangements than under others. Accountability is also said to 
be high (not higher but still low) under the Court’s preferred approach. And 
for these accountability gains to materialize, each condition for retrospective 
voting must be satisfied. 
Thanks to their shared logic, the Court’s claims can all be depicted 
graphically using a variant of the chart presented earlier. The x-axis now 
represents voters’ appraisal of the relevant actor’s record: the President, a 
member of Congress, a state government official, or a generic incumbent.141 
The y-axis now denotes the likelihood that voters will support this actor. 
According to the Court, as shown in Figure 2, Scenario 1, there is a strong 
and steeply sloped relationship between the two variables if the President 
exerts more control over agencies, Congress delegates fewer decisions to 
agencies, state governments enact their own policies, or campaign 
expenditures are unrestricted. But per the Court and Figure 2, Scenario 2, 
this relationship becomes weak and flat if the President has less sway over 
agencies, Congress assigns more choices to agencies, state governments are 
forced to act by their federal overseers, or campaign spending is limited. In 
other words, accountability is both high absolutely in Scenario 1 and higher 
relative to Scenario 2. 
This chart, though, gives the Court’s claims a patina of empiricism they 
have not actually earned. It is striking, in fact, that in the many cases in which 
the Court has made assertions about accountability, it has never backed these 
assertions with any facts.142 Instead, the Court’s analysis has been highly 
 
 141 Voters’ appraisal of an incumbent’s record works well as the x-axis for the Court’s first three 
claims because all of them primarily involve voters’ attributions of responsibility—the next of the 
conditions for retrospective voting. But for the Court’s campaign finance claim, which mostly relates to 
voters’ knowledge of an incumbent’s record, the objective record itself is a better choice for the x-axis. 
Here the idea is that when voters know more about the record, thanks to higher campaign spending, there 
is a steeper relationship between the record and voters’ likelihood of supporting the incumbent. 
Conversely, when voters know less about the record, thanks to lower campaign spending, the relationship 
between the record and voters’ behavior is flatter. 
 142 See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American 
Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2015) (noting in the federalism context that “the Court’s political 
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abstract and theoretical, “a matter of words rather than of evidence,” as Cass 
Sunstein once quipped.143 The goal of the next Part, then, is to progress from 
words to evidence—to subject the Court’s claims to rigorous empirical 
scrutiny and see how they fare. To give away the ending, my conclusion is 
that they do not fare well at all, at least in most circumstances. 
 



















III. ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE 
I carry out my empirical assessment in the same way (more or less)144 
for all of the Supreme Court’s claims about electoral accountability. I first 
partition each claim into four constituent pieces corresponding to the four 
conditions for retrospective voting. For each condition, I then present the 
political science evidence that refutes the Court’s reasoning, typically by 
showing that the criterion is unmet even though it would have to be satisfied 
for the Court to be correct. Lastly, I discuss the findings that partly redeem 
 
accountability argument turns on a dubious empirical claim for which the Court has supplied no empirical 
evidence”); Magill, supra note 35, at 1181 n.166 (observing in the separation of powers context that 
“accountability rests on unproved empirical assumptions”). 
 143 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 326 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine). 
 144 The exception is the Court’s campaign finance claim, whose rebuttal requires a different 
analytical structure. See infra Section III.D. 
More presidential control  
Less congressional delegation 
No federal commandeering 
No campaign finance limits 
Less presidential control  
More congressional delegation 
Federal commandeering 
Campaign finance limits 
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the Court’s claims, at least for certain voters in certain settings. These 
findings are why this Article discounts accountability as a constitutional 
value but does not entirely dismiss it. 
I concede at the outset that there is only a limited amount of direct 
evidence about the Court’s claims.145 In future work, I plan to add to this 
small stock. But here I have no choice but to highlight the vast body of 
indirect evidence, drawing inferences from it about the validity of the 
Court’s analysis. Why is the explicit proof so sparse? One reason is that few 
surveys ask voters the right questions about their knowledge, judgments, 
attributions, and modes of voting, in part because these queries are so 
challenging that they “undermine rapport between interviewers and 
interviewees.”146 Another explanation is that it is difficult to study 
retrospective voting observationally since key aspects of voter psychology 
cannot be gleaned from aggregate election results.147 And perhaps most 
importantly, “the statistical literature examining” retrospective voting “has 
focused almost exclusively on whether the incumbent party is rewarded for 
economic performance or punished for unpopular wars.”148 There is far less 
work on the subtler forms of accountability implicated by the Court’s claims. 
A. The President 
1. Voter Knowledge 
To start, consider the Court’s argument that the President is more 
electorally accountable for agency actions when she exerts more control over 
the bodies.149 For this argument to hold, voters must know about the agency 
conduct. If this first condition for retrospective voting is not fulfilled, voters 
cannot appraise the agency actions, attribute responsibility for them, or vote 
based on these appraisals and attributions. Unfortunately, I am unaware of 
 
 145 See Schacter, supra note 35, at 2 (“[W]hat is missing is a sustained, empirical analysis of the 
political accountability that is offered to support claims . . . .”). 
 146 Stephen Earl Bennett, Trends in Americans’ Political Information, 1967-1987, 17 AM. POL. Q. 
422, 424 (1989); see also, e.g., Martin Gilens, Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences, 
95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 379, 380 (2001) (“Survey questions that assess the level of general political 
information are relatively uncommon, and items that assess policy-specific information are rare indeed.”). 
 147 See, e.g., Johns, supra note 58, at 61 (pointing out that observational analysis “based on aggregate 
election results . . . is a highly indirect means of inferring the basis for voters’ decisions”); Alex I. Ruder, 
Agency Design, the Mass Media, and the Blame for Agency Scandals, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 514, 
515 (2015) (“One challenge facing observational studies . . . on responsibility attributions is controlling 
and measuring the information that voters encounter . . . .”). 
 148 Lawrence W. Kenny & Babak Lotfinia, Evidence on the Importance of Spatial Voting Models in 
Presidential Nominations and Elections, 123 PUB. CHOICE 439, 440 (2005); see also George C. Edwards 
III et al., Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 108, 
109 (1995) (“Issues, such as the economy and war, underlie virtually all studies . . . .”). 
 149 See supra Section II.A. 
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any survey that has asked voters about their knowledge of agency regulations 
or adjudications.150 However, all of the indirect evidence on this score 
suggests that most voters know very little about most agency activity. The 
first criterion for holding the President accountable for agency behavior, 
then, is typically unmet. 
In a useful study, Ruder tracked the New York Times’s coverage of 
regulatory agencies. Most agencies, including significant ones like the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, received very little coverage: fewer than 
fifty articles per year even mentioned each of them.151 Only a handful of 
agencies earned more extensive attention, on the order of two hundred or 
more annual articles each: the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Federal Reserve, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.152 And even 
these figures paled compared to the coverage of other issues often thought to 
be within the President’s purview. In the final year of Ruder’s study, 2007, 
more than six thousand articles mentioned the Iraq or Afghanistan wars, and 
almost nine thousand referred to the economy.153 
The implication of this work—that voters tend to be uninformed about 
agency actions because these actions are rarely reported by the media—is 
confirmed by the available survey evidence. In what remains the definitive 
examination of voter knowledge, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter 
assembled all survey questions addressing some aspect of public information 
over a sixty-year period.154 For the category of questions involving “people 
and parties,” “fully 62 percent . . . were answered correctly by fewer than 
half of those surveyed.”155 Similarly, Ilya Somin analyzed answers to the 
2000 American National Election Study (ANES), the preeminent recurring 
 
 150 In their definitive study of voters’ political knowledge, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter 
tallied approximately 200,000 survey questions over a sixty-year period. It appears that none of these 
questions involved voters’ awareness of (as opposed to views on) agency actions. See MICHAEL X. DELLI 
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 
(1996). Nor did I find any such queries when I examined questionnaires for the American National 
Election Study, the General Social Survey, or the National Annenberg Election Survey—all prominent 
political polls. 
 151 See Ruder, supra note 147, at 530 fig.2. 
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. at 528 (noting coverage range of 1987–2007). My Lexis searches produced 6,547 hits for 
Iraq or Afghanistan and 8,930 hits for the economy. 
 154 DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 65–67. 
 155 Id. at 77–78. Likewise, “[m]ore than 60 percent of the items tapping knowledge of domestic 
politics could not be answered by as many as half of those asked,” id. at 82, and “more than half of the 
553 foreign affairs items could be answered by less than half the general public,” id. at 85–86. 
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poll about voter behavior.156 He found that only about one-third of 
respondents knew that the crime rate had fallen and that federal spending on 
the poor had risen during President Clinton’s tenure, even though these were 
“indisputably [some] of the most important political issues of the 1990s.”157 
The 2012 ANES painted a similarly grim picture; fewer than 30% of 
respondents knew that the economy had improved and that unemployment 
had declined over the previous year.158 
Thanks to findings like these, in Delli Carpini’s words, “[t]here is a 
consensus that most citizens are politically uninformed.”159 Somin has 
reached an even stronger conclusion: “The most important point established 
in some five decades of political knowledge research is that the majority of 
American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.”160 That this 
ignorance applies to presidents’ specific policy stances as well as general 
economic conditions during their terms has been demonstrated by survey 
evidence. That the ignorance further extends to agency actions has not been 
shown, but cannot reasonably be doubted. The same voters who are unaware 
of key presidential positions and vital economic indicators cannot plausibly 
be expected to know about lower-salience agency regulations and 
adjudications.161 Without such knowledge, though, these voters cannot vote 
retrospectively based on agency performance.162 
2. Voter Judgments 
For the Court’s claim about presidential accountability to be valid, the 
next requirement is that voters form judgments about agency actions. Unless 
voters come to hold opinions about them, the actions cannot result in any 
 
 156 See Somin, supra note 49, at 1306–07. 
 157 Id. at 1315–16; see also ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17–46 (2013) (reporting similar statistics for the 2000–2014 period). 
 158 See AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, USER’S GUIDE AND CODEBOOK FOR THE ANES 2012 TIME 
SERIES STUDY 325, 331 (2015). 
 159 Michael X. Delli Carpini, In Search of the Informed Citizen: What Americans Know About 
Politics and Why It Matters, 4 COMM. REV. 129, 132 (2000). 
 160 Somin, supra note 49, at 1304; see also, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information 
Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194, 194 (1996) (“The political ignorance of the 
American voter is one of the best-documented features of contemporary politics . . . .”). 
 161 Importantly, Delli Carpini and Keeter found that “citizens who are the most informed about one 
aspect of national politics tend to be the most informed about other aspects.” DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, 
supra note 150, at 18. The public’s general lack of knowledge about politics can therefore be assumed to 
hold for agency activity. See also Schacter, supra note 35, at 9 (arguing that studies of voter knowledge 
“make it wildly implausible to believe that voters know enough . . . to make workable the accountability 
axiom”). 
 162 As noted earlier, in theory at least, informational cues based on knowledge that voters themselves 
lack, such as newspaper endorsements, could enable voters to cast their ballots as if they were properly 
informed. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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electoral reward or punishment for the President. Unsurprisingly, given that 
there is no work on voters’ knowledge of agency conduct, there is also none 
on voters’ appraisal of it. However, political scientists have begun to study 
how voters evaluate other elements of presidents’ records, finding that 
partisanship infects these evaluations to their core. Assuming that this 
conclusion is generalizable, it means that any retrospective voting that occurs 
based on agency performance deviates markedly from the theoretical ideal. 
Larry Bartels has conducted the most probing analysis of how 
partisanship biases voters’ judgments of objective indicators. For a series of 
variables—unemployment, inflation, crime, and so on—he compared 
Democratic and Republican respondents’ views of how the measures 
changed during President Ronald Reagan’s and President Bill Clinton’s 
terms.163 In many cases, he found gaping and self-serving partisan 
differentials, with Democrats stating that conditions improved under 
Democratic control and worsened under Republican rule, and Republicans 
exhibiting the opposite pattern.164 For example, Democrats (wrongly) 
thought that unemployment and inflation increased during President 
Reagan’s tenure.165 Likewise, Republicans (incorrectly) asserted that federal 
spending on the poor rose under President Reagan and that the crime rate 
went up under President Clinton.166 
Delli Carpini and Keeter relied on the same survey data as Bartels, but 
added a twist showing how factual misperceptions distort retrospective 
voting. Like Bartels, they determined the proportions of respondents who 
mistakenly believed that the federal government’s spending on the poor, the 
environment, and public schools increased under President Reagan.167 But 
unlike Bartels, they then calculated the shares of these respondents who 
approved of the supposed spending increases and who voted for Vice 
President George H.W. Bush in the 1988 presidential election.168 These 
shares were very high, between two-thirds and three-fourths, suggesting that 
many voters held inaccurate views of the federal government’s activity in 
 
 163 Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, 24 POL. 
BEHAV. 117, 126–38 (2002). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 136. 
 166 Id. at 136–37; see also Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We’re Thinking: 
The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy 13–14 (Aug. 3–Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript 
prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), 
https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/AchenBartels011107/AchenBartels011107.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XG4E-YLB2] (reporting similar findings); Christopher S. Elmendorf & David 
Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 363, 380 (same). 
 167 DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 263–64. 
 168 Id. 
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the 1980s, favored this purported activity, and voted to continue it.169 In 
essence, these voters rewarded Republican administrations for policies they 
did not actually enact, or alternatively, failed to punish the administrations 
for adopting policies the voters opposed. 
If this finding applies to agency actions, it implies that retrospective 
voting on their basis is warped. Democrats and Republicans who know about 
the actions assess them differently, with Democrats supporting steps taken 
during Democratic administrations and opposing ones implemented in 
Republican terms, and Republicans doing the opposite. The reward–
punishment model on which accountability depends is thus compromised. 
To some degree, presidents are rewarded by their copartisans and punished 
by the other party’s adherents no matter what agencies actually do. 
3. Voter Attributions 
This brings us to the third and most important criterion that must be met 
for the Court’s claim to be correct: when the President exercises more control 
over agencies, voters must attribute more responsibility to her for the agency 
conduct. Two of the reasons for doubting this link should be familiar from 
the preceding discussion. Many voters have no idea how much influence the 
President wields over different agencies; and many voters’ attributions of 
responsibility for agency actions are driven more by partisanship than by the 
President’s sway over the bodies. These problems with the Court’s account 
are complemented by another one: many voters overattribute responsibility 
to the President, deeming her fully in charge of even independent agencies.170 
Again, no data exists on voters’ knowledge of presidential control over 
agencies. But again, Ruder’s study of the New York Times’s coverage of 
agency activity is instructive. For an array of agencies, he calculated the 
fraction of newspaper articles that mentioned both the agency and the 
President—a rough but passable proxy for presidential authority over a 
body.171 He found that there is essentially no connection between this fraction 
 
 169 See id. 
 170 A further problem, highlighted conceptually by Aziz Huq and empirically by Jed Stiglitz, is that 
presidential powers thought to increase control over agencies may not actually have this effect. Instead, 
the exercise of these powers may prompt responses by other actors, Congress in particular, leaving 
presidential control unchanged or even diminished. See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53 (2013) (discussing these “[s]trategic response effects”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Folk 
Theories and Constitutional Values, Cornell Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 16-10, at 16 (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737997 [https://perma.cc/RMF9-HEGJ] 
[hereinafter Stiglitz, Folk Theories] (finding that the presence of the legislative veto increases 
gubernatorial accountability for economic performance); Stiglitz, supra note 98, at 1163–65 (finding that 
after the legislative veto was invalidated in Missouri, the legislature compensated for its loss by enacting 
more specific statutes). 
 171 See Ruder, supra note 147, at 531 (“This measure captures media attention to the broad range of 
issues that involve the president and federal agencies: appointments, political controversy, and public 
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and whether an agency is executive or independent. The President was 
named in fewer articles (below 15%) on executive agencies like the Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.172 
But she was cited in more articles (above 30%) on independent agencies like 
the Federal Election Commission and the Federal Reserve.173 
According to Ruder, this analysis “reveals one possible way that the 
accurate assignment of blame can be undermined by news coverage of 
agencies.”174 “[A]gencies that are relatively insulated from presidential 
control [can] receive a large share of articles that mention the president,” and 
vice versa.175 But there is an even more obvious way that accurate 
responsibility attributions can be foiled. Voters can simply be uninformed 
about presidential influence over agencies, not misinformed by the media. 
Survey evidence shows that only about one-quarter to one-third of 
respondents can identify agency heads such as the Treasury Secretary and 
the Chair of the Federal Reserve.176 These low figures make it highly 
implausible that much of the public knows, say, whether an agency is led by 
a single official or a multimember board, or whether the President’s removal 
power is plenary or limited to good cause. 
Beyond voters’ lack of information, their partisanship also impairs their 
attributions of presidential responsibility. Thomas Rudolph has found that, 
under divided government in the late 1990s, Democrats who thought the 
economy was improving were more inclined to credit President Clinton for 
the progress.177 Conversely, Democrats who saw the economy as worsening 
tended to blame the Republican Congress for the deterioration.178 More 
 
discussions of agency policy.”); see also Stiglitz, supra note 98, at 1170–71 (using newspaper mentions 
of the governor to measure gubernatorial control over state agencies). 
 172 Ruder, supra note 147, at 531. 
 173 Id. Ruder carried out a similar analysis for newspaper articles mentioning executive agencies and 
referring specifically to regulation. One might expect the President to be named in about the same 
proportion of these articles no matter which agency is covered. But in fact, the proportion of articles 
identifying the President varies from about 20% (for the Food and Drug Administration and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration) to roughly 60% (for the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Small Business Administration). Id. at 534. 
 174 Id. at 532. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See, e.g., DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 79 (“[F]ewer than a quarter of those asked 
were able to identify the holders of any but the most visible and prestigious cabinet posts . . . .”); SOMIN, 
supra note 157, at 36 (36% of the public could name the Treasury Secretary and the Chair of the Federal 
Reserve in 2008). 
 177 Thomas J. Rudolph, Who’s Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of 
Responsibility Attributions, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 698, 704–06 (2003). 
 178 Id.; see also Brad T. Gomez & J. Matthew Wilson, Causal Attribution and Economic Voting in 
American Congressional Elections, 56 POL. RES. Q. 271, 277 (2003) (finding that “Democrats are much 
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recently, Steven Nawara has extended Rudolph’s work to the Obama era, to 
foreign policy as well as the economy, and to current and former 
presidents.179 Again, as Democrats’ impressions brightened of conditions in 
the economy and in Iraq, they became more likely to deem President Obama 
rather than President Bush responsible for the gains, and vice versa.180 
If these results hold for agency actions, they mean that presidents’ credit 
or blame for the actions often does not stem from their control over the 
bodies. Instead, presidents’ co-partisans commonly consider them 
responsible only for agency conduct they favor, assigning authorship to other 
actors (like the agency itself) for conduct they dislike. The other party’s 
backers tend to behave in the opposite fashion, crediting anyone but the 
President for appealing agency measures and blaming her for unwelcome 
ones. A mix of partisanship and perception thus drives responsibility 
attribution—not, as the Court asserts, presidential authority. 
A final factor that drives responsibility attribution, especially among 
less sophisticated voters, is the “tendency to see the president as the sole 
relevant (perhaps omnipotent) governmental actor in the U.S. political 
system.”181 In a series of amusing studies, scholars have shown that 
presidents are punished at the polls for many events that, objectively, are not 
their fault: droughts and floods,182 tornadoes,183 college football defeats,184 
even shark attacks.185 If this logic of “blind retrospection”186 is valid for 
agency actions too, then once more it is immaterial how much control the 
President actually has over the bodies. Whether her influence is high or low, 
many voters perceive it to be high, and therefore hold her responsible for 
agency conduct.187 
 
more likely than Republicans to see President Clinton as primarily responsible for both the general state 
of the national economy and for the federal budget surplus”). 
 179 Steven P. Nawara, Who Is Responsible, the Incumbent or the Former President? Motivated 
Reasoning in Responsibility Attributions, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 110, 120–21 (2015). 
 180 Id. at 122–24; see also Cigdem V. Sirin & José D. Villalobos, Where Does the Buck Stop? 
Applying Attribution Theory to Examine Public Appraisals of the President, 41 PRESID. STUD. Q. 334, 
345–47 (2011) (reporting similar results from an experiment involving the economy and foreign policy). 
 181 Brad T. Gomez & J. Matthew Wilson, Political Sophistication and Attributions of Blame in the 
Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 38 PUBLIUS 633, 637 (2008). 
 182 Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, 
Flu, and Shark Attacks 24–25 (Estudio, Working Paper 2004/199, 2004). 
 183 Andrew Healy & Neil Malhotra, Random Events, Economic Losses, and Retrospective Voting: 
Implications for Democratic Competence, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI. 193, 197–98 (2010). 
 184 Andrew J. Healy et al., Irrelevant Events Affect Voters’ Evaluations of Government Performance, 
107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12804, 12806 (2010). 
 185 Achen & Bartels, supra note 182, at 14. 
 186 Id. at 8. 
 187 Of course, this point cuts in a somewhat different direction from the previous one. If voters 
attribute all responsibility to the President, then they do not assign credit and blame on partisan grounds. 
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4. Modes of Voting 
This leaves the fourth premise on which the Court’s claim rests: that 
voters cast their presidential ballots based on their judgments of, and 
attributions for, agency actions. If voters evaluate these actions, credit or 
blame the President for them—but nevertheless vote on other grounds—then 
the three preceding steps are all for naught. Unfortunately for the Court’s 
argument, this scenario appears to be the norm. Even retrospective voters 
focus on broader issues than agency performance. Retrospective voting also 
occurs only sporadically, under certain atypical conditions. And other modes 
of voting tend to dominate retrospective voting when pitted against it. 
Predictably, there is no direct evidence on the prevalence of 
retrospective voting based on agency conduct. However, the inferential case 
is very strong that such voting is, at best, highly infrequent. Agencies take 
an enormous number of actions, almost all of which are less salient than the 
economic and foreign policy conditions that are usually thought to motivate 
retrospective voting. It beggars belief that many voters are making their 
presidential choices in any large part because of these actions. As Aziz Huq 
has remarked, “Federal administration comprises a vast array of entities 
taking on an incalculable number of decisions . . . . How can voters use a 
single quadrennial ballot to express preferences on that enormous range of 
policy decisions?”188 
Interestingly, in many circumstances, voters do not even use their 
ballots to reward or punish presidential incumbents for the state of the 
economy—the classic basis for retrospective voting. In a recent review of 
the literature on economic voting, Christopher Anderson concluded that its 
impact is “intermittent, highly contingent, and substantively small.”189 
Underpinning this conclusion are psychological points that have been 
covered already: voters “systematically misjudge the state of the economy 
 
As with most aspects of voter psychology, the solution to this puzzle is that there are many kinds of 
voters, all behaving in complicated ways. Partisanship, for instance, tends to be a more powerful driver 
for higher information voters, see Achen & Bartels, supra note 166, at 66, 69, while lower information 
voters are more prone to holding the President responsible for external developments, see Gomez & 
Wilson, supra note 178, at 277. 
 Voters’ tendency to attribute too much responsibility to the President also gives rise to a different 
kind of argument for greater presidential control over agencies: If voters are going to credit or blame the 
President anyway for agency actions, why not grant the President more authority over the bodies? This 
way voters would assign responsibility to an actor who actually is responsible. This argument, though, is 
quite distinct from the Court’s. Its crux is that greater presidential control is advisable given voters’ 
attribution errors, not that greater presidential control yields greater presidential accountability. 
 188 Huq, supra note 170, at 64; see also Rubin, supra note 33, at 2080 (observing that most agency 
“decisions are simply too fine-grained to become factors in an electoral campaign”). 
 189 Anderson, supra note 53, at 286. 
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even when it is presented to them on a silver platter,”190 and assign 
“responsibility for good performance to the party they support and blame 
parties they do not like for inferior economic performance.”191 Plainly, if 
retrospective economic voting is uncommon, retrospective voting based on 
agency performance must be even rarer. The lack of knowledge and partisan 
bias that afflict the former must be still more pervasive for the latter. 
If voters do not cast their ballots retrospectively in presidential elections 
(at least not primarily), how do they cast them? Scholars have not settled on 
a single answer, but they have found that several other modes of voting are 
more influential than retrospective voting.192 For example, Brad Lockerbie 
determined that, in all but one of the presidential elections from 1956 to 
2000, “prospective economic items” relating to voters’ future economic 
expectations were “much more powerful than their retrospective 
counterparts.”193 Party identification and ideology were also stronger 
determinants of vote choice than the retrospective items, which were 
statistically significant in only three out of twelve elections.194 Similarly, 
James Campbell and his coauthors showed that, in presidential elections 
from 1972 to 2004, party identification, ideology, and demographic variables 
such as income, race, and religion were significant drivers of vote choice.195 
Retrospective economic evaluations, though, were not.196 
The upshot of these studies is that the Court’s argument about 
presidential accountability is mostly wrong. Even if voters know about 
agency actions, judge them impartially, and attribute responsibility for them 
accurately—all flawed assumptions themselves—voters generally do not 
cast their presidential ballots based on these judgments and attributions. 
 
 190 Id. at 280. 
 191 Id. at 281. For other scholars pointing out the limits of economic voting, see Justine D’Elia & 
Helmut Norpoth, Winning with a Bad Economy, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 467, 471 (2014) (noting that 
its assumptions are “highly contingent and need not hold in many situations and political contexts” 
(internal citations omitted)); Joel A. Middleton, What Do We Know About Economic Voting? 30 (May 
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with Northwestern University Law 
Review) (“[A]fter decades of research, fundamental debates are unresolved, and it is difficult to say which 
of the competing theoretical accounts of this phenomenon have carried the day.”). 
 192 For a discussion of other modes of voting, see supra Section I.C. 
 193 BRAD LOCKERBIE, DO VOTERS LOOK TO THE FUTURE? ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS 67 (2008). 
 194 Id. at 65. 
 195 Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 1092. 
 196 Id. For additional work in this vein, see DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 254–61 
(finding that issue positions are a statistically significant driver of presidential vote choice for well-
informed citizens but economic evaluations are not); FIORINA, supra note 39, at 197 (“In analysis after 
analysis, . . . future expectations dwarfed the effects of retrospective judgments . . . .”); LEWIS-BECK ET 
AL., supra note 71, at 376 (finding that “for the typical contemporary American voter,” “more lasting 
factors” than economic assessments, “such as socioeconomic status and party identification, are formed 
first”). 
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Indeed, voters often do not cast their presidential ballots based on any prior 
developments, not even the state of the economy. 
5. Countervailing Evidence 
However, the Court’s argument is mostly wrong—which is to say 
slightly right—for two reasons. The first is implicit in the analysis to this 
point. While most voters cannot satisfy the conditions for retrospective 
voting based on agency conduct, there are presumably some who can. These 
exemplary voters know about higher-profile agency actions, appraise them 
reasonably objectively, deem the President more responsible if the agency is 
executive and less so if it is independent, and make their voting decisions 
partly on these grounds. These voters, that is, hold the President more 
electorally accountable for agency performance when she exercises more 
control over the bodies, just as the Court supposes. 
But while the number of these model citizens is not zero, it is surely 
very small. The members of this “information elite”197 are also highly 
unrepresentative of the electorate as a whole—not just in their voting 
behavior but in their age, gender, income, and race as well. According to 
both Delli Carpini and Keeter198 and Somin,199 the most politically 
knowledgeable respondents are disproportionately old, affluent, white men. 
Even if there is accountability along the lines contemplated by the Court, 
then, it is likely to be skewed accountability to a subset of the public. This 
sort of “asymmetric[]” accountability, “with too much to some voters and 
not enough to others,” may be as normatively troublesome as no 
accountability at all.200 
The second reason not to reject the Court’s claim entirely is more 
empirical. Observationally, Ruder has found that national newspapers are 
more than twice as likely to mention the President when reporting on the 
antitrust activities of the Department of Justice as when covering those of the 
Federal Trade Commission (an independent agency).201 Experimentally, 
Ruder has also determined that when subjects read a newspaper article that 
cites the aspects of the Commission that insulate it from presidential control, 
 
 197 Delli Carpini, supra note 159, at 27. 
 198 See DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 156–74. 
 199 See Somin, supra note 49, at 1354–63. 
 200 Schacter, supra note 35, at 11; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 1474–79 (discussing 
the problems caused by officeholders’ asymmetric responsiveness to donors sharing these demographic 
traits). Worth noting, though, is the possibility that officeholders might be asymmetrically responsive to 
different issue publics depending on the policy, not the same information elite at all times. This sort of 
shifting asymmetric accountability may not be as problematic. 
 201 See Ruder, supra note 98, at 313–14; see also id. at 321 (finding that coverage of the Justice 
Department more often has a political valence). 
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their attributions of presidential responsibility for the Commission’s actions 
do not change significantly.202 Conversely, when subjects read an article that 
refers to the key structural features of the Minerals Management Service (an 
executive agency), their assignments of presidential responsibility rise 
dramatically.203 These results dovetail nicely with the Court’s reasoning. The 
media sometimes distinguishes between executive and independent agencies 
in its coverage, and this distinction affects people’s responsibility 
attributions exactly as the Court expects. 
As noted earlier, though, the media does not always distinguish between 
executive and independent agencies in its reporting.204 It is also doubtful that 
people accurately process the information conveyed by the media in non-
experimental settings. And even in controlled experiments, subjects’ 
responsibility attributions have not been linked to their voting behavior. It 
has not been shown, that is, that subjects become more likely to vote for 
(against) the President after finding out that an executive agency has a strong 
(weak) record. Accordingly, Ruder’s work is not enough to vindicate the 
Court’s assertion. Rather, the fairest conclusion from the available evidence 
is that presidential control over an agency is largely—but not wholly—
unrelated to presidential accountability for the body’s actions. 
B. Congress 
1. Voter Knowledge 
Next, take the Court’s claim that Congress is more electorally 
accountable for decisions it does not delegate to agencies but rather makes 
itself.205 For this claim to hold, the first prerequisite is that voters know about 
 
 202 In this experiment, the key passage that subjects read was: “The FTC, led by a 5-member 
bipartisan commission, is designed to function independently from presidential control. The 
commission’s current chairman was appointed by the president.” Id. at 326. Compared to the no-
information condition, respondents were somewhat more likely to attribute “a little” or “some” 
responsibility to the President, and somewhat less likely to attribute “a lot” of responsibility. See id. at 
329. 
 203 In this experiment, the key passage that subjects read was: “MMS is under the direction of 
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, who has led the cabinet-level department as part of the Obama 
administration. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, since 2009 alone the Obama 
administration has reviewed and approved several MMS regulations related to deepwater oil exploration.” 
Ruder, supra note 147, at 521; see also id. at 523 (showing that respondents in the treatment group were 
much more likely to assign “a lot” of responsibility to the President). 
 204 See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 205 See supra Section II.B. Interestingly, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule rebut this claim in 
essentially the opposite way that I do. My response is that, empirically, Congress is rarely electorally 
accountable for anything it does, so giving Congress more to do would not significantly boost its 
accountability. Posner and Vermeule’s argument, on the other hand, is that Congress is already 
accountable for its decisions to delegate authority to agencies. Therefore, there is no accountability 
shortfall that less congressional delegation could redress. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring 
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the decisions, whether they are made by Congress or by another body. 
Earlier, I described the work suggesting that most voters know very little 
about most agency activity. The media tends not to cover this activity in any 
depth, and most voters are so generally uninformed that they cannot be 
expected to know much about matters as specific as agency regulations and 
adjudications.206 
This work is complemented by a sizeable literature showing that most 
voters know little about congressional activity either. In their landmark study 
of political knowledge, Delli Carpini and Keeter noted that majorities of the 
public were unaware of the passage of major education, immigration, and 
urban affairs laws in the 1960s.207 In the 1990s, Douglas Arnold cited surveys 
revealing “virtually no awareness of important [bills] that the media had 
covered more lightly,” addressing issues such as “abortion, campaign 
finance, bank bailouts, defense spending,” and several others.208 Also in this 
period, John Zaller found that only about 12% of respondents could identify 
any bill that their House member had voted on in the previous two years.209 
And more recently, Jeffery Mondak and his coauthors reported that only slim 
majorities of the public could state correctly whether Congress enacted 
legislation on handgun sales or campaign finance during George W. Bush’s 
presidency.210 
These results are in stark tension with the idea that Congress’s 
accountability would improve if only it made more of the hard policy choices 
 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (2002) (“Congress is accountable when it 
delegates power—it is accountable for its decision to delegate power to the agency.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 My only quarrel with Posner and Vermeule’s claim is that it is based on a normative assertion about 
what voters should do, not empirical evidence about what they in fact do. See, e.g., id. at 1746 (“If citizens 
have the capacity to sanction politicians who make bad policy in statutes, they should also have the 
capacity to sanction politicians who . . . delegate authority to . . . agencies . . . .”). My reading of the 
literature is that most citizens do not have the capacity to sanction politicians for either making decisions 
themselves or delegating those decisions to other bodies. 
 Also worth noting here is Stiglitz’s finding that, at the state level, legislatures do not change their 
drafting practices in response to judicial decisions striking down their laws on nondelegation grounds. 
See Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 19 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). If this result generalizes to the federal level, then 
a revival of the nondelegation doctrine obviously would not increase congressional accountability 
because it would not actually change Congress’s behavior. 
 206 See supra Section III.A.1. 
 207 See DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 80–81. 
 208 R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS, THE PRESS, AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 117, 123 
(2004). 
 209 JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 76 (1992); see also Donald R. 
Songer, Government Closest to the People: Constituent Knowledge in State and National Politics, 
17 POLITY 387, 388 (1984) (reporting a similar finding). 
 210 Jeffery J. Mondak et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? The Impact of Information on Mass 
Attitudes Toward Congress, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 34, 38 (2007). 
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itself. Most voters are unaware of these choices when (as is often the case 
today) they are delegated to agencies. But most voters would remain 
unaware of the choices if Congress were compelled to grapple with them 
directly. That, at least, is the import of the fact that most voters do not know 
about the bills that Congress already considers. 
2. Voter Judgments 
For the Court’s argument to persuade, the second requirement is that 
voters would appraise the additional decisions that Congress would make if 
the nondelegation doctrine were enforced. Stephen Ansolabehere and Philip 
Jones have shown that most respondents are willing to give their opinions 
on items on the congressional agenda. In a survey that asked about eight 
congressional bills, “over 90% of the sample answered at least four of the 
questions,” and a plurality offered their views on all eight.211 However, 
several experimental studies have determined that the preferences that 
subjects express on congressional bills are a function less of the bills’ policy 
content and more of the subjects’ partisanship. 
All of these experiments proceeded in roughly the same fashion. 
Subjects were provided with information about a particular congressional 
bill: the Energy Independence Act,212 the DREAM Act,213 the Aviation 
Reauthorization Act,214 and so on. Subjects in the control group were then 
asked to what extent they approved or disapproved of the bill. In contrast, 
subjects in the treatment group were told about the parties’ respective 
positions on the bill before being prompted for their own opinion. In all 
cases, subjects in the treatment group voiced preferences that were 
significantly more aligned with their parties’ stances (and so significantly 
more polarized). For example, Democrats’ and Republicans’ views on the 
Energy Independence Act became 10–15% more reliably partisan in 
response to the cue.215 Attitudes toward the DREAM Act shifted even further 
toward the party line, by 15–25%.216 
 
 211 Stephen Ansolabehere & Philip Edward Jones, Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll-
Call Voting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 586 (2010). 
 212 Toby Bolsen et al., The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion, 36 POL. 
BEHAV. 235, 244 (2014). 
 213 James N. Druckman et al., How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation, 
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 61 (2013). 
 214 Matthew S. Levendusky, Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization, 
32 POL. BEHAV. 111, 119 (2010); see also Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. 
L. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003). 
 215 Bolsen et al., supra note 212, at 248. 
 216 Druckman et al., supra note 213, at 69. A related literature finds partisan differences in overall 
congressional approval, with Democrats tending to approve (disapprove) of Congress when it is 
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These experiments suggest that congressional accountability would not 
rise much even if voters knew about the extra congressional activity 
undertaken due to a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. As with existing 
legislation, Democratic voters would favor (disfavor) bills supported 
(opposed) by Democratic elites, and Republican voters would exhibit the 
opposite pattern. Members of Congress thus would not be rewarded or 
punished based on the substance of the new legislation. Instead, its political 
consequences would largely follow the same partisan fault lines that underlie 
the work that Congress already performs. 
3. Voter Attributions  
The third criterion for the Court’s claim to be correct is that voters 
would attribute responsibility accurately for Congress’s additional actions. 
At the aggregate level, voters would know which party backed a given 
decision and which party objected to it. Likewise, at the individual level, 
voters would know whether their member of Congress voted for or against a 
particular bill.217 
Stephen Bennett tracked the percentage of respondents who knew 
which party held more seats in the House of Representatives before and after 
each election from 1960 to 1984. This percentage typically hovered between 
40% and 50%, though it dropped to 14% in 1980.218 Analogously, the Pew 
Research Center asked respondents which party controlled a majority of the 
House from 1989 to 2009. Anywhere from 31% of respondents (in 2001) to 
86% (in 2009) answered this question correctly, with a long-term average 
near 50%.219 Around half of the public therefore has a mistaken impression 
(or none at all) of the majority party in Congress. It is doubtful that these 
individuals can carry out the more difficult task of crediting or blaming the 
right party for any new congressional legislation. 
 
controlled by Democrats (Republicans), and Republicans exhibiting the opposite pattern. See, e.g., THE 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 477–78 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005). 
 217 Additionally, voters would need to attribute more responsibility to Congress for decisions it does 
not delegate but rather makes itself. At least in experiments, subjects told about the institution responsible 
for a policy do exactly that. See Adam Hill, Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental 
Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 311, 
322, 327 (2015) (finding that subjects assign less blame to Congress when it delegates to agencies than 
when it legislates directly). 
 218 Bennett, supra note 146, at 427–28. 
 219 News Release, Pew Research Ctr., Pew Research News IQ Quiz; Well Known: Public Option, 
Sonia Sotomayor; Little Known: Cap & Trade, Max Baucus 7 (Oct. 14, 2009); see also, e.g., DELLI 
CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 76 (“Over half of those surveyed could also usually . . . say which 
party controlled the U.S. House and Senate.”). 
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At the individual level, Ansolabehere and Jones220 and Chris 
Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw221 have conducted the most useful 
research on voters’ knowledge of their Congress members’ positions. Both 
pairs of scholars found that survey respondents are often able to distinguish 
between the stances of Democratic and Republican members. Over a set of 
eight congressional bills, “[t]he overall correlation between the perceived 
and actual positions of legislators . . . is .66.”222 However, respondents’ 
awareness of intraparty differences in voting records is much lower. The 
correlation between perceived and actual positions falls to .28 for 
Democratic members and .10 for Republican members.223 Similarly, while 
59% of the variance in legislators’ voting records is captured by a model 
including both parties’ members, this proportion drops to 15% for a 
Democrat-only model and 8% for a Republican-only model.224 
These findings mean that if the nondelegation doctrine required 
Congress to enact more legislation, the correct party would sometimes be 
deemed responsible but the correct politicians frequently would not be. 
Members who voted against their party would be especially prone to be 
credited or blamed for stances they did not actually take. Once again, voters’ 
lack of information would prevent congressional accountability from 
responding in the manner predicted by the Court.225 
4. Modes of Voting 
The fourth premise of the Court’s argument is that voters would cast 
their congressional ballots based on their appraisals of, and attributions for, 
Congress’s additional actions. This premise’s doubtfulness is illustrated by 
a number of studies that have examined how legislators’ roll call votes 
influence their vote shares in subsequent elections. These studies have 
determined that most roll call votes have a negligible electoral impact. For 
 
 220 Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 586–89. 
 221 Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Does the Spatial Proximity Between Legislators 
and Voters Affect Voting Decisions in U.S. House Elections? 20–23 (Feb. 2015), 
http://cwarshaw.scripts.mit.edu/papers/TW_SpatialVoting150519.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2BT-SMFZ]. 
 222 Id. at 23; see also Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 587 (“Of those who did offer a 
judgment about how their members voted on some roll calls, the average percent right equals 72% . . . .”). 
 223 Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 221, at 23. 
 224 Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 588; see also id. (finding that when members voted 
with their party, 82% of respondents correctly stated their votes, but that when members voted against 
their party, only 42% of respondents correctly stated their votes). 
 225 As noted earlier, voters’ responsibility attributions for economic and foreign policy conditions 
are also skewed by their partisan affiliations. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. This 
dynamic has not been studied with respect to congressional bills, but seems less likely to apply in this 
context. It is ambiguous who should be credited or blamed for general conditions, but quite clear who 
voted for or against legislation. Partisanship thus probably manifests itself more at the appraisal stage and 
less at the attribution stage for congressional bills. 
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instance, Brandice Canes-Wrone and her coauthors found that votes on 
environmental policy never significantly affected House incumbents’ vote 
shares from 1988 to 2004, and that votes on criminal policy rarely did so.226 
Similarly, Gregory Bovitz and Jamie Carson showed that, over the 1974–
2000 period, 80–84% of House incumbents’ votes on “key” bills had no 
effect on their electoral performance.227 And assessing House incumbents’ 
key votes from 2003 to 2012, Tausanovitch and Warshaw concluded that 
“there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that voters hold legislators . . . 
accountable on important votes.”228 
That retrospective voting is not a common voting mode at the 
congressional level has also been demonstrated with respect to overall 
economic conditions. According to Lockerbie, voters’ prospective economic 
expectations dominated their retrospective economic assessments in House 
and Senate elections from 1956 to 2002, just as they did in presidential 
elections.229 Likewise, according to Raymond Duch and Randolph 
Stevenson, voters’ evaluations of the economy were less influential in 
American congressional elections from 1980 to 2000 than in the 
parliamentary elections of the seventeen other countries in their study.230 
These recent analyses confirm what was a contrarian verdict when Robert 
Erikson first reached it twenty-five years ago: that past “economic conditions 
in fact matter little in congressional elections.”231 
If past economic conditions and roll call votes matter little, what factors 
matter more? The literature on congressional voting is too rich and varied to 
be easily summarized, but almost all studies agree on the importance of three 
variables.232 The first is voters’ partisan affiliation; unsurprisingly, voters are 
 
 226 Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Issue Accountability and the Mass Public, 36 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 
18 tbl.1, 20, 24 & tbl.3 (2011). 
 227 Gregory L. Bovitz & Jamie L. Carson, Position-Taking and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, 59 POL. RES. Q. 297, 300–01 & tbl.1 & n.10 (2006) (considering votes on bills 
deemed important by Congressional Quarterly). 
 228 Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 221, at 46. 
 229 LOCKERBIE, supra note 193, at 82, 90; see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 230 See RAYMOND M. DUCH & RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, THE ECONOMIC VOTE: HOW POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS CONDITION ELECTION RESULTS 72–73 (2008). 
 231 Robert S. Erikson, Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel 
Evidence, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 375 (1990); see also Owen G. Abbe et al., Agenda Setting in 
Congressional Elections: The Impact of Issues and Campaigns on Voting Behavior, 56 POL. RES. Q. 419, 
420 (2003) (noting that “economic policy outcomes . . . are either much weaker or absent [as a driver of 
vote choice] at the congressional level”). However, past economic conditions may be more influential for 
certain kinds of voters, such as those with ambivalent partisan attitudes, see Scott J. Basinger & Howard 
Lavine, Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 169, 175 (2005), or those 
who are more politically sophisticated, see Gomez & Wilson, supra note 178, at 279. 
 232 See, e.g., Matthew K. Buttice & Walter J. Stone, Candidates Matter: Policy and Quality 
Differences in Congressional Elections, 74 J. POL. 870, 875 (2012) (referring to party identification, 
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very likely to support candidates who belong to the same party as them. 
Indeed, “party typically swamps all else in individual-level models of voting 
behavior.”233 The second variable is voters’ ideology; voters are strongly 
inclined to back candidates who share their political philosophy. As Boris 
Shor and Jon Rogowski have written in the best work on the topic, “spatial 
proximity between voters and their House incumbents does very well in 
predicting individual vote choice.”234 And the third driver is the President’s 
approval rating. In both House and Senate elections, the more popular the 
President is with the public, the better candidates from her his party do, and 
vice versa.235 
The potency of presidential approval is notable because the President is 
a distinct political actor from Congress. Congressional elections become 
what political scientists call second-order to the extent they are shaped by 
external presidential forces rather than internal congressional ones.236 
Electoral accountability is impossible in second-order elections since 
incumbents prosper or suffer based on developments beyond their control. 
Of course, party and ideology are first-order variables relating to Congress 
members themselves. But they too are inconsistent with the Court’s claim 
that accountability would rise if the nondelegation doctrine were enforced. 
Voters who cast their congressional ballots based on partisan affiliation and 
 
ideology, and presidential approval as “standard predictors in the congressional elections literature”). 
Two more variables worth noting are incumbency and demography. Incumbents enjoy a substantial 
advantage over challengers—albeit one that has shrunk in recent years. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, It’s 
Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections, 77 J. POL. 861, 863 
(2015). Aspects of voters’ demography, race in particular, significantly influence vote choice as well. See, 
e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1351–59 (2016). 
 233 Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 592; see also GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 146–47 (9th ed. 2016) (referring to “partisanship as the single most 
important influence on individuals’ voting decisions”); Elizabeth N. Simas, Proximity Voting in the 2010 
U.S. House Elections, 32 ELECTORAL STUD. 708, 711 (2013) (finding that “93.9% of all voters voted for 
the candidate from their own party” in the 2010 House election). 
 234 Shor & Rogowski, supra note 69, at 24; see also, e.g., Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 
591 (finding that ideological distance is a highly significant variable in House elections); Brendan Nyhan 
et al., One Vote Out of Step?: The Effects of Salient Roll Call Votes in the 2010 Election, 40 AM. POL. 
RES. 844, 856 (2012) (same). 
 235 See, e.g., Jamie L. Carson et al., The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress, 54 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 598, 609 (2010) (finding that presidential approval is a highly significant variable in House elections); 
Benjamin J. Kassow & Charles J. Finocchiaro, Responsiveness and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. 
Senate, 39 AM. POL. RES. 1019, 1031 (2011) (same in Senate elections). 
 236 See, e.g., David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 773 n.39 
(2017) (noting that elections are second-order when “voters use preferences developed in relation to one 
level of government . . . as a guide for voting at an entirely different level of government”). However, the 
distinction between presidential and congressional elections is less stark than that between, say, 
presidential and municipal elections. 
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political philosophy would not cast them based on the extra decisions that 
Congress would make. 
5. Countervailing Evidence 
At least, voters would not generally cast their ballots based on those 
extra congressional decisions. Sometimes they would, though, especially if 
the decisions were highly salient. That is the consensus of several recent 
studies finding that while most congressional votes carry no electoral 
consequences, a few high-profile votes do matter at the polls. That is also 
why the Court’s argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. If Congress 
could no longer delegate policy choices to agencies, it would have to make 
some of those choices itself. Typically, the additional choices would be 
electorally immaterial. But on occasion, the choices would strike a chord 
with voters, and congressional incumbents would be punished or rewarded 
for their positions. 
The same pieces that established the electoral irrelevance of most 
congressional votes also identified several exceptions to the rule. For 
example, Canes-Wrone and her coauthors showed that Democratic House 
incumbents who supported stringent anti-crime measures in the 1994–1998 
period performed several percentage points better at the polls.237 This was a 
time of “extraordinary public concern about the issue,” during which it paid 
to be tough on crime.238 Similarly, if 80–84% of the key votes examined by 
Bovitz and Carson from 1974 to 2000 did not affect House incumbents’ vote 
shares, then 16–20% of the votes did have an impact.239 These more 
influential matters tended to be ones that attracted more media coverage and 
as to which Congress was more evenly divided.240 
In the 2000s too, Ansolabehere and Jones determined that three of the 
eight roll call votes they analyzed were statistically significant drivers of 
voter behavior.241 Voters were more likely to support House incumbents who 
backed tax breaks for energy companies, capital gains tax cuts, and the 
reauthorization of the Patriot Act.242 And still more recently, Gary 
Jacobson243 and Brendan Nyhan and his coauthors244 found that House 
incumbents were punished for voting for items on President Obama’s 
 
 237 Canes-Wrone et al., supra note 226, at 18, 22. 
 238 Id. at 20. 
 239 Bovitz & Carson, supra note 227, at 300–01. 
 240 Id. at 303; see also Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 221, at 46 (finding “a relatively modest 
relationship between the roll call positions of legislators on important votes and citizens’ vote choice”). 
 241 Ansolabehere & Jones, supra note 211, at 591. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Gary C. Jacobson, The Republican Resurgence in 2010, 126 POL. SCI. Q. 27, 48 (2011). 
 244 Nyhan et al., supra note 234, at 856–57. 
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legislative agenda. At the district level, they did three to five percentage 
points worse in 2010 if they supported health care reform, financial 
regulation, or the stimulus package.245 At the individual level, survey 
respondents were about five points less likely to vote for them if they backed 
Obamacare.246 
Plainly, most of the decisions that Congress would have to make if the 
nondelegation doctrine grew teeth would not be as momentous as 
Obamacare—or even tax breaks for energy companies. This mine run of new 
legislation would not change incumbents’ electoral fortunes, and the Court’s 
claim is wrong with respect to it. But the Court’s claim is not necessarily 
wrong with respect to that small subset of agency business that draws 
widespread attention and that would have to be handled by Congress, not the 
administrative state, if nondelegation were a binding rule. The available 
evidence indicates that congressional incumbents would sometimes be held 
accountable for this atypical activity.247 
C. State Governments 
1. Voter Knowledge 
Now turn to the Court’s argument that state governments are more 
electorally accountable when they are not commandeered (or otherwise 
compelled to act) by the federal government.248 This argument has the same 
four prerequisites as the Court’s claims about presidential and congressional 
accountability: in the absence of federal commandeering (or its equivalent), 
voters must be aware of state governments’ actions, appraise them, attribute 
responsibility for them, and vote based on these appraisals and attributions. 
The argument also has the same flaws as the Court’s other claims, namely, 
that the four prerequisites are rarely satisfied. As these flaws should be 
familiar by this point (and as the body of relevant work is smaller for state 
 
 245 Jacobson, supra note 243, at 49. 
 246 Nyhan et al., supra note 234, at 856–57. 
 247 For this to be true, congressional incumbents would also have to be deemed more responsible for 
bills they vote on than for policies enacted by agencies. As noted earlier, this is indeed the case. See supra 
note 225. It is also worth flagging the potential downside of asymmetric accountability if the 
nondelegation doctrine were revived. Cf. John D. Griffin & Patrick Flavin, Racial Differences in 
Information, Expectations, and Accountability, 69 J. POL. 220, 226 (2007) (finding that white constituents 
are more likely than African-American constituents to hold House members accountable for their voting 
records). 
 248 See supra Section II.C. 
112:989 (2018) Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law 
1041 
governments than for the President or Congress249), I march through them 
fairly briskly. 
First, with respect to voter knowledge, people are at least as unaware of 
state policies as of federal ones. Delli Carpini and Keeter conducted a state-
level survey of political information in Virginia. They found a high 
correlation between respondents’ (low) knowledge of national politics and 
their (even lower) knowledge of state politics.250 They also found that state 
political knowledge has almost the same demographic and socioeconomic 
determinants (age, education, gender, income, and so on) as national political 
knowledge.251 Donald Songer carried out another state-level informational 
survey, this time in Oklahoma. He determined that about one-quarter of 
respondents could identify their state representative, compared to roughly 
half who could name their member of Congress.252 He also showed that 
respondents were about three times more likely to state correctly their 
Congress member’s votes on high-profile bills (31%) than their state 
representative’s stances (11%).253 
The implication of these results is that even when state governments 
make their own decisions, free from any federal interference, voters are often 
unaware of the decisions. Lacking this knowledge, voters are often unable to 
reward or punish state governments for their choices. As Steven Rogers has 
observed, the “[l]ittle media attention” given to state governments combines 
with the presence of “uncompetitive political environments” to “create 
unfavorable conditions for accountability in many states.”254 
2. Voter Judgments 
Second, with respect to voter judgments, they are distorted by 
partisanship whether they involve specific state policies or general state 
conditions. At the policy level, John Bullock performed an experiment in 
 
 249 Kevin Arceneaux, Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?, 
35 PUBLIUS 297, 297 (2005) (“Few studies have focused on representational linkages in a federal 
system.”). 
 250 DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 150, at 151 (reporting a correlation of 0.74). 
 251 Id. at 149 tbl.4.2. The main differences are that employment status is significant at the state but 
not at the national level, and that race is significant at the national but not at the state level. Id. 
 252 Songer, supra note 209, at 390; see also Steven Rogers, Accountability in State Legislatures: 
How Parties Perform in Office and State Legislative Elections 4–5 (Oct. 17, 2013) (job market paper, 
Vanderbilt University), http://www.stevenmrogers.com/Dissertation/ChapterDrafts/
CollectiveAccountability/Rogers-CollectiveAccountability.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9RJ-JQWC] 
(reporting a similar result). 
 253 See Songer, supra note 209, at 393; see also Steven Rogers, Electoral Accountability for State 
Legislative Roll Calls and Ideological Representation, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555, 557 (2017) (noting 
that state legislative elections receive less than one-fourth of the media coverage of congressional 
elections). 
 254 Rogers, supra note 253, at 557. 
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which he informed his subjects about either an expansion or a contraction of 
a state’s Medicaid program.255 He also told some of his subjects about the 
positions taken on the issue by the state’s Democratic and Republican 
legislators. As in the analogous congressional studies, Democratic subjects 
became more (less) supportive of Medicaid expansion if they learned that 
Democratic legislators backed (opposed) the measure.256 Republican 
subjects’ views swung even further toward the stances of Republican 
elites.257 
At the level of state economic conditions, Adam Brown found that they 
were assessed differently in 2006 by Democratic and Republican 
respondents living in states with Democratic governors. Democrats 
(Republicans) in these states tended to think that the state economy was 
stronger (weaker) than the national economy, which was associated with 
President George W. Bush and the Republican Congress.258 Conversely, 
Democrats’ and Republicans’ state economic evaluations were nearly 
identical in states with Republican governors.259 There was no partisan 
distinction that these respondents could make between local and national 
conditions, both of which were linked to Republican rule. 
These findings suggest that even when voters know about the records 
that state governments have autonomously compiled, their partisanship still 
impairs them from holding the governments accountable. Democratic voters 
tend to approve of poor performances by Democratic administrations and to 
frown on good ones by Republican administrations. Republican voters tend 
to do the opposite. As a result, objective accountability is replaced, to some 
degree, by a partisan dynamic untethered to reality. 
3. Voter Attributions 
Third, with respect to voter attributions, they are compromised both by 
a lack of information about state governmental duties and by partisanship. 
As to information, Rogers determined that respondents in 2010 were about 
thirty percentage points less likely to know which party controlled their state 
 
 255 John G. Bullock, Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate, 105 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 496, 500 (2011). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id.; see also Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence 
on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 811 (2003) (finding that subjects’ opinions 
on a state welfare program are much more affected by party endorsements than by the program’s 
generosity or stringency). 
 258 Adam R. Brown, Are Governors Responsible for the State Economy? Partisanship, Blame, and 
Divided Federalism, 72 J. POL. 605, 610–11 (2010). 
 259 Id. 
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legislature than which party held a majority in Congress.260 Similarly, Fred 
Cutler showed that respondents essentially guess when asked to rate states’ 
authority over various policy areas—agriculture, health care, taxes, and so 
on. “[V]ariation across issues is strikingly minimal,” and all of “[t]he means 
are between six and eight on the 0–10 scale.”261 Because respondents’ 
assignments of state responsibility are little more than speculation, it is 
unsurprising that, in a separate analysis, Robert Johns was unable to explain 
the vast majority of their variation. The weakness of Johns’s models implied 
that the assignments “were in many cases nonattitudes, delivered off the top 
of respondents’ heads and not tightly linked to their broader political 
thinking.”262 
As to partisanship, both Lonna Atkeson and Cherie Maestas263 and Neil 
Malhotra and Alexander Kuo264 examined the attitudes of Louisiana 
Democrats and Republicans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
According to Atkeson and Maestas, about four-fifths of Democrats blamed 
the federal government, then under unified Republican control, for failing to 
respond adequately to the storm, compared to only two-fifths of 
Republicans.265 Likewise, according to Malhotra and Kuo, roughly three-
fifths of Democrats thought President Bush was most to blame for Katrina’s 
devastation, as opposed to only one-fifth of Republicans.266 In place of 
President Bush, Republicans were much more likely than Democrats to fault 
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin 
(both Democrats).267 
These studies add to the pessimistic account of state governmental 
accountability. Voters cannot properly reward or punish state governments 
 
 260 Rogers, supra note 252, at 4–5; see also id. at 25 (showing empirically that due to their confusion 
over party control, voters “sometimes punish the party that actually is in power when they intend to 
reward them”). 
 261 Fred Cutler, Whodunnit? Voters and Responsibility in Canadian Federalism, 41 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 
627, 638 (2008) (surveying respondents in Ontario and Saskatchewan). It is unfortunate that an analogous 
American study has not been conducted. 
 262 Johns, supra note 58, at 67 (surveying respondents in Ontario and Scotland); see also Kevin 
Arceneaux, The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held Accountable for the Functions 
Relevant to Their Office, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 731, 743–44 (2006) (finding that voters’ responsibility 
attributions have little impact on their voting decisions in state and federal elections). 
 263 LONNA RAE ATKESON & CHERIE D. MAESTAS, CATASTROPHIC POLITICS: HOW EXTRAORDINARY 
EVENTS REDEFINE PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT (2012). 
 264 Malhotra & Kuo, supra note 56. 
 265 ATKESON & MAESTAS, supra note 263, at 81; see also Cherie D. Maestas et al., Shifting the 
Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following Hurricane Katrina, 38 PUBLIUS 
609, 620 (2008) (finding that Republicans were more likely to blame the Democrat-run state government 
for failing to ask for enough help). 
 266 Malhotra & Kuo, supra note 56, at 127. 
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for their actions when, due to voters’ lack of information and partisan bias, 
they cannot accurately attribute responsibility for those actions. The 
evidence of voters’ confusion over state governments’ duties is especially 
damning for the Court’s claim. It means that even when states are not being 
compelled to do anything by their federal overseers, many voters are unsure 
which level of government is in charge of each policy area. The lines of 
accountability, that is, are blurred even in the absence of federal 
commandeering.268 
4. Modes of Voting 
Lastly, with respect to modes of voting, state legislative elections are 
mainly second-order and gubernatorial elections are considerably so. To the 
extent these elections are first-order, they are also dominated by non-
retrospective voting. Rogers recently completed the most thorough analysis 
of the drivers of state legislative outcomes, showing in several ways that they 
are mostly national in scope. For instance, seat changes in state legislative 
elections were almost perfectly correlated with seat changes in congressional 
elections from 1910 to 2010.269 Likewise, state legislative results were 
largely unaffected by states’ economic growth rates, standardized test scores, 
and crime rates from 1972 to 2010.270 At the voter level, presidential approval 
exerted more than three times the influence of state legislative approval on 
respondents’ state legislative vote choices in 2008 and 2010.271 And at the 
state legislator level, out of thirty bills that both representatives and the 
public voted on from 1998 to 2014 (because they doubled as referenda), 
twenty-six had no perceptible impact on representatives’ subsequent vote 
shares.272 
 
 268 As with the Court’s congressional accountability claim, see supra note 205, some scholars rebut 
the Court’s state governmental accountability claim in the opposite way that I do. I argue that state 
governmental accountability is low whether or not federal commandeering takes place. In contrast, they 
assert that state governmental accountability is high even in the presence of commandeering because 
voters can accurately discern which level of government is responsible for each policy. See, e.g., Evan H. 
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement 
Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1063 (1995) (contending that voters “can investigate whether 
those actions lie within the discretion of that [state] executive . . . or whether they are mandated by . . . 
federal statute”); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2006) (arguing that citizens who care about public affairs can discern 
which governmental body is responsible for a particular regulation). The problem with this position is 
again empirical. There is no evidence that most voters can distinguish between state and federal policy 
responsibilities, and much evidence that they usually cannot. 
 269 Rogers, supra note 252, at 5–6. 
 270 Id. at 13–15. 
 271 See id. at 20; see also id. at 24 (confirming this result with New Jersey survey data from 1973 to 
2007). 
 272 See Rogers, supra note 253, at 568–69 & tbl.6; see also id. at 560–61 (finding that a one standard 
deviation increase in a state legislator’s ideological extremism reduces her vote share by only 0.7%); 
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As for gubernatorial elections, scholars have debated for years whether 
they are shaped mostly or entirely by national forces. The early 
“conventional wisdom” was that a “national-level effect” prevailed, 
“whereby only incumbent candidates of the president’s party are rewarded 
or punished based upon prevailing economic conditions” nationwide.273 But 
more recent studies have effectively challenged this consensus, finding that 
gubernatorial outcomes are a function of both national factors, especially the 
state of the economy and the President’s approval rating, and state 
variables.274 There is no need to settle this argument here; the key point for 
present purposes is that “[f]ew dispute that national partisan trends and 
national economic conditions influence gubernatorial approval and 
elections.”275 Gubernatorial elections are thus at least partly second-order. 
Moreover, insofar as state legislative and gubernatorial elections are 
first-order, retrospective voting takes a back seat in them to other voting 
modes. These other modes are the usual suspects from the earlier discussions 
of presidential and congressional voting: party, ideology, and demography.276 
In state legislative elections, Bradford Bishop and Rebecca Hatch 
determined that all three of these factors are more potent than voters’ 
approval of the state legislature’s performance.277 Similarly, in gubernatorial 
elections, Atkeson and Randall Partin278 and Richard Niemi and his 
coauthors279 both showed that evaluations of the state economy are typically 
less influential than other forms of first-order voting. 
 
Nathaniel A. Birkhead, The Role of Ideology in State Legislative Elections, 40 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55, 70 
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Reelection in State Legislatures, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 858, 869 (2008) (finding that a state legislator’s vote 
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 273 Lonna Rae Atkeson & Randall W. Partin, Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of 
Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 100 (1995); see also, e.g., John E. 
Chubb, Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 133, 145 
(1988) (“[S]tate voters have generally and increasingly looked outside of the state—to the national 
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 274 See, e.g., Thomas M. Carsey & Gerald C. Wright, State and National Factors in Gubernatorial 
and Senatorial Elections, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 994, 1000 (1998); Cohen & King, supra note 42, at 1277; 
Richard G. Niemi et al., State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors Accountable?, 
39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 936, 952 (1995); Justin Wolfers, Are Voters Rational?: Evidence from Gubernatorial 
Elections 6–7 (Jan. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://users.nber.org/~jwolfers/papers/Voterrationality(latest).pdf [https://perma.cc/M2D4-ZHTE]. 
 275 Brown, supra note 258, at 606. 
 276 See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.4. 
 277 Bradford H. Bishop & Rebecca S. Hatch, Perceptions of State Parties and Voting in State 
Elections 25 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Rogers, supra note 252, at 
20 tbl.4, 24 tbl.5. 
 278 Atkeson & Partin, supra note 273, at 104 tbl.2. 
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These results further illustrate the implausibility of the Court’s 
argument. Even if voters know about state governments’ decisions, assess 
them reasonably, and assign responsibility for them correctly (perhaps 
thanks to a lack of federal coercion), voters still need to cast their ballots 
based on these assessments and assignments for there to be accountability. 
An ocean of evidence, though, indicates that this is simply not how voters 
tend to cast their state ballots. Instead, voters tend to cast them above all on 
national grounds, and in part on non-retrospective state grounds. 
5. Countervailing Evidence 
What is left, then, of the Court’s claim? Not much, which is why this is 
the domain where I am most inclined to reject the Court’s reasoning outright 
rather than merely to discount it. But even here, there do exist certain 
findings that lend some tentative support to the Court’s analysis. First, it 
appears that at least in a few policy areas, or at least if they are more 
knowledgeable, voters are able to distinguish between state and federal 
duties. In a survey conducted by Bryan Caplan and his coauthors, 
respondents attributed somewhat less responsibility to state and local 
governments than to the President and Congress for the economy, and 
somewhat more for education and crime.280 In Cutler’s survey, better 
educated and more politically aware respondents also came closer in their 
responsibility attributions to the judgments of a panel of experts.281 It is 
conceivable that these positive results would be worsened by federal 
commandeering of state governments. In that event, voters might become 
unable to make even the limited intergovernmental distinctions that represent 
their current capacity. 
Second, the flip side of the above summary of voter behavior in state 
elections is that some retrospective voting does take place. At the state 
legislative level, Rogers determined that approval of the state legislature is 
linked to vote choice,282 that four of thirty bills had measurable electoral 
consequences,283 and that extreme incumbents suffer at the polls compared 
to their more moderate peers.284 Likewise, at the gubernatorial level, recent 
 
 280 Bryan Caplan et al., Systematically Biased Beliefs About Political Influence: Evidence from the 
Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey, 46 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 760, 761 & tbl.1 
(2013); see also Thomas J. Rudolph, Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility, 
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attributions). 
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studies agree that states’ economic conditions affect governors’ electoral 
performances,285 and the same may also be true of governors’ fiscal records286 
and responses to natural disasters.287 Again, it is possible that these flickers 
of accountability would die out if the federal government began compelling 
the states to act. Then voters might abandon even the occasional 
retrospective voting in which they now engage. 
The problem with these two defenses, though, should be readily 
apparent. Both of them rely entirely on conjecture about what could happen 
if state governments were federally conscripted. There is no evidence that 
voters’ attributions of responsibility or retrospective decisions—such as they 
are—actually would be attenuated in that scenario. There is only a status quo 
that is not entirely devoid of accountability, and a suspicion that things might 
change for the worse if federal interference intensified. This suspicion is not 
wholly fanciful, but it is still a flimsy foundation for a claim of constitutional 
stature. 
D. Incumbents 
1. Affirmative Evidence 
The Court’s final assertion about accountability is that it is enhanced by 
campaign finance deregulation—specifically, by the unlimited campaign 
spending that deregulation enables.288 This assertion differs from the Court’s 
other arguments in that it applies to all incumbents, not to officeholders in a 
particular branch or level of government. For this reason, the assertion is best 
rebutted not by (once again) going through the conditions for retrospective 
voting, but rather by following the causal path between campaign finance 
regulation and accountability. There are three major steps along this path, all 
of which defy the Court’s expectations. First, regulation reduces incumbents’ 
spending advantage over challengers. Second, incumbents’ smaller spending 
advantage produces more competitive elections. And third, voters respond to 
greater competition by learning more about incumbents’ records and more 
often voting based on them. 
The crucial backdrop for the first step is that, in the absence of 
regulation, incumbents raise and spend far more money than challengers. 
 
 285 See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 286 Robert C. Lowry et al., Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States, 
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 759, 765–67 (1998). 
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 288 See supra Section II.D. The Court has made this assertion in cases involving expenditure limits, 
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Incumbents have wider fundraising networks than their opponents, deeper 
relationships with donors, and more sticks and carrots with which to solicit 
contributions—and they exploit these assets to the hilt. In 2006, for example, 
state house incumbents raised an average of $172,000 in states with no (or 
very high) contribution limits, while their challengers mustered only 
$37,000.289 Similarly, in the most recent congressional election, incumbent 
House members collected an average of $1.6 million, compared to only 
$232,000 for their challengers.290 
Precisely because incumbents benefit from deregulation, regulation 
curbs their resources more than it does those of their opponents. Challengers’ 
capacity to attract donations is low enough that it is unaffected by most 
fundraising restrictions. Incumbents’ capacity, in contrast, is much higher, 
and so is materially constrained by regulation. In the most rigorous study of 
this topic, Thomas Stratmann found that, in state house elections from 1996 
to 2006, tight individual contribution limits increased challengers’ share of 
total spending by seven percentage points, and decreased the fundraising gap 
between incumbents and challengers by twenty percentage points.291 Strict 
contribution limits on political action committees (PACs) shrank 
incumbents’ spending advantage by a similar amount.292 So did caps on 
donations from corporations, unions, and PACs in gubernatorial elections 
from 1990 to 2000, as reported by Kihong Eom and Donald Gross in another 
valuable study.293 
Notably, regulation also tends to equalize candidates’ resources when 
it takes the form of public financing rather than restrictions on contributions. 
Challengers’ spending rises due to the infusion of public funds, while 
incumbents’ spending falls due to the expenditure limits that inevitably 
accompany the governmental grants. Examining the consequences of full 
 
 289 See Thomas Stratmann, How Close Is Fundraising in Contested Elections in States with Low 
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public financing in state legislative elections from 1990 to 2010, Andrew 
Hall determined that it lessened incumbents’ spending advantage by about 
seventeen percentage points. That is, incumbents accounted for roughly 72% 
of total spending without the policy, but just 55% with it.294 Gross and his 
coauthors came to a comparable (though less dramatic) conclusion for partial 
public financing in gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 1997.295 
The second link in the causal chain is that greater parity in candidates’ 
resources gives rise to closer elections. It does so for the simple reason that, 
controlling for other factors, more spending by a candidate improves her 
electoral performance.296 So when the spending differential between 
incumbents and challengers is smaller, the gap between their vote shares 
shrinks as well. Stratmann established this point with respect to contribution 
limits and state house elections from 1980 to 2006. He showed that the 
average margin of victory declined from about 55% when there were no (or 
very high) limits to roughly 25% when limits were very low.297 Likewise, 
David Primo and his coauthors found that in gubernatorial elections from 
1978 to 2004, winning candidates prevailed by about ten percentage points 
less when contribution limits were in place.298 
The same logic holds for public financing; by reducing incumbents’ 
spending advantage, it erodes their electoral edge too. According to Hall, the 
boost that candidates receive due to incumbency falls by roughly 50% in 
states with generous governmental grants299—a result confirmed by Timothy 
Werner and Kenneth Mayer.300 According to Malhotra, the average margin 
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of victory drops by ten to forty percentage points when a challenger accepts 
full public financing.301 These are striking outcomes, indicating, in 
Malhotra’s words, that “clean elections laws are . . . effective tools of 
enhancing competition.”302 
The last piece of the puzzle is that electoral competition promotes 
electoral accountability. Voters acquire more of the information they need to 
vote retrospectively in competitive settings, and they actually use this 
information to vote retrospectively at higher rates. In a groundbreaking 
study, Jones analyzed how voter knowledge and voter behavior are related 
in competitive and uncompetitive Senate elections. In competitive elections, 
voters are able to state correctly more of the positions taken by incumbent 
senators on high-profile bills.303 The jump in voter information from 
uncompetitive to competitive elections is equivalent to “the difference 
between constituents with no high school degree and those with a post-
college degree,” “the difference between women and men,” and “the 
difference between whites and blacks.”304 
Furthermore, voters in competitive milieus not only learn more about 
incumbent senators’ records, but also are more likely to cast their ballots 
based on these records. In the least competitive elections, voters who 
disagree with the bulk of their senators’ positions still vote for the senators 
about two-thirds of the time.305 In the most competitive elections, in contrast, 
“that support all but vanishes,” and poorly represented voters “support the 
incumbent just 12.3% of the time.”306 Accountability is thus strongly 
connected to competition. “The more competitive a state is, the more 
responsive the electorate, and the more an incumbent can expect to be 
punished for any ‘out of step’ votes she casts.”307 
Together, these three causal steps mean that the Court’s view of how 
campaign finance regulation affects electoral accountability is exactly 
backward. Regulation does not undermine accountability; rather, it augments 
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it by (1) decreasing incumbents’ spending advantage, thereby (2) making 
elections more competitive, and thereby (3) increasing the prevalence of 
retrospective voting. Moreover, this is the case for a wide array of reforms 
enacted by the states: contribution limits on individuals, corporations, 
unions, and PACs; expenditure limits tied to governmental grants; and partial 
and full public financing. All of these reforms change the financial and 
electoral environment in ways that render incumbents more accountable for 
their actions. 
2. Countervailing Evidence 
As always, though, there is a catch—two of them, in fact. The first is 
that candidate spending tends to improve voter knowledge. Jacobson showed 
that, for both House and Senate candidates, voters’ ability to recognize and 
recall their names rises along with their per-voter expenditures.308 Similarly, 
John Coleman and Paul Manna determined that, for House candidates, their 
spending makes voters more willing to assess their ideologies and to state 
their positions on various issues.309 These findings suggest that by lowering 
candidate outlays, campaign finance regulation could lessen voter 
knowledge, and with it, accountability. 
But this is a remote prospect. Crucially, while incumbents’ spending 
informs voters to a degree, challengers’ spending does so to a much greater 
extent. For instance, as Senate incumbents’ expenditures vary from their 
lowest to their highest level, the likelihood that voters can recall the 
incumbents’ names increases by only 8%.310 The equivalent figure for Senate 
challengers is 57%.311 Likewise, the impact of House incumbents’ spending 
on voters’ willingness to rate their ideologies is several times smaller than 
that of House challengers’ spending.312 This disparity in the efficacy of 
incumbents’ and challengers’ outlays is why campaign finance regulation 
does not reduce accountability even though it cuts candidate spending. It 
primarily cuts incumbents’ less informative expenditures while leaving 
largely unscathed challengers’ more edifying ones. 
 
 308 See JACOBSON, supra note 233, at 143; see also Jennifer Wolak, The Consequences of Concurrent 
Campaigns for Citizen Knowledge of Congressional Candidates, 31 POL. BEHAV. 211, 220 tbl.1, 222 tbl.2 
(2009) (same result for House candidates). 
 309 John J. Coleman & Paul F. Manna, Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of 
Democracy, 62 J. POL. 757, 772 tbl.5, 774 tbl.6 (2000). 
 310 JACOBSON, supra note 233, at 143. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Coleman & Manna, supra note 309, at 772; see also Wolak, supra note 308, at 220 tbl.2, 222 
tbl.3, 225 tbl.4 (finding that challenger spending has a greater impact on voter recognition, recall, and 
knowledge than incumbent spending). 
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The second catch is that not all restrictions of money in politics foster 
accountability. Prior to 2003, the major political parties could raise and 
spend unlimited amounts of “soft money.”313 The parties disproportionately 
deployed these funds on behalf of challengers, especially challengers in close 
races where additional resources might push them over the top.314 In 2003, 
though, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 
which banned the solicitation and receipt of soft money.315 In the wake of the 
law’s passage, the gap between incumbents’ and challengers’ expenditures 
in tight House races grew significantly, from about $600,000 to roughly 
$900,000.316 This spike in incumbents’ spending advantage presumably 
caused a decline in both competition and accountability,317 though 
regrettably, this hypothesis has yet to be tested explicitly. 
BCRA is a useful cautionary tale, highlighting how hard it can be to 
predict the consequences of campaign finance regulation. That BCRA likely 
made members of Congress less accountable, though, in no way implies that 
other reforms would do the same. For one thing, most other reforms 
(contribution limits, public financing, and so on) have been around for 
decades. There has thus been ample time to evaluate their effects at all 
governmental levels. For another, parties are unique among funding sources 
in channeling more of their money to challengers than to incumbents. 
Individuals, corporations, unions, and PACs all give more heavily to 
incumbents,318 meaning that when their activities are curtailed, incumbents’ 
spending advantage falls, and competition and accountability rise. 
Accordingly, the BCRA experience is not generalizable, and most campaign 
finance laws indeed render incumbents more accountable. 
 
 
 313 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–32 (2003) (discussing soft money, issue advocacy, and 
Congress’s investigation into their abuses), rev’d, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 314 See McConnell, 540 U.S.  at 249–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part); Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase 
Funding for Moderates and Challengers? 16 (Jan. 8–11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript prepared for 
presentation at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association) (on file with the 
Northwestern University Law Review) (showing that in the absence of party limits, challengers receive 
16% of their funds from parties and incumbents receive 7%). 
 315 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133–34. 
 316 Raymond LaRaja, Will the BCRA Strengthen the Political System? Negative: BCRA Is Not 
Improving the Political System, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 604, 605 (2005). 
 317 See Stratmann, supra note 297, at 151 (“[T]his law has probably benefitted the current office 
holders relative to their potential challengers.”). 
 318 Michael Jay Barber, Buying Representation: The Incentives, Ideology, and Influence of 
Campaign Contributors in American Politics 17 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review); La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 314, at 
8, 16. 
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*          *          * 
 
To recap, the Court contends that electoral accountability is both high 
in absolute terms and higher in relative terms when (1) the President 
exercises more control over federal agencies, (2) Congress delegates fewer 
decisions to agencies, (3) state governments are not federally 
commandeered, and (4) money in politics is unregulated. An exhaustive 
canvass of the empirical literature, though, leads to a very different 
conclusion. This survey reveals that accountability is actually low in absolute 
terms, and at best marginally higher in relative terms, in the scenarios 
contemplated by the Court. The Court is not entirely wrong, but it is only 
slightly right. 
This point can be made graphically using a final variant of the chart 
presented earlier. The x-axis again represents voters’ appraisal of the relevant 
actor’s record: the President, a member of Congress, a state government 
official, or a generic incumbent.319 The y-axis again denotes the likelihood 
that voters will support this actor. According to the empirical literature, as 
shown in Figure 3, Scenario 1, there is only a weak and flat relationship 
between the two variables even when presidential control is robust, 
congressional delegation is rare, federal commandeering is absent, and 
campaign finance is unfettered. True, this relationship is not quite as weak 
and flat as that captured by Figure 3, Scenario 2 and depicting the opposite 




 319 As before, an incumbent’s actual record—not voters’ appraisal of her record—works better as the 
x-axis for the Court’s campaign finance claim. See supra note 141. Additionally, given that campaign 
finance regulation improves accountability and deregulation worsens it, the “Campaign finance limits” 
and “No campaign finance limits” lines should be positioned somewhat differently. I omit this adjustment 
for the sake of simplicity. 
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IV. ACCOUNTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
The error of the Court’s claims raises a number of interesting questions. 
Why has the Court gone astray in its reasoning about how different policies 
affect accountability? If the Court is committed to promoting accountability, 
how might it actually achieve this goal? And is the advancement of 
accountability an appealing aim, or are there other democratic values—or 
perhaps other modes of argument entirely—that the Court should be 
pursuing instead? 
These are large questions, too large to be fully answered here. Still, I do 
begin to engage with them in this Part. In my view, the Court’s aversion to 
empirical evidence is the most important explanation for the inaccuracy of 
its assertions. Even a cursory look at the relevant facts would expose the 
assertions’ tenuousness, but the Court has never taken this look. To further 
accountability, I think the Court would be wise to shift its attention from 
institutional relations to electoral competition. The Court has no control over 
the aspects of governmental structure that shape accountability, but its 
decisions can make elections more (or less) competitive. And precisely 
because it is so difficult to move the accountability needle, the Court should 
consider prioritizing other democratic goods. The alignment of 
More presidential control  
Less congressional delegation 
No federal commandeering 
No campaign finance limits 
Less presidential control  
More congressional delegation 
Federal commandeering 
Campaign finance limits 
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governmental outputs with voters’ preferences, in particular, is both a 
compelling aspiration and one the Court can help realize. 
A. Explanations 
It is rarely productive to speculate about why the Court makes mistakes. 
Mistakes tend to be in the eye of the beholder, and guesses about the Court’s 
thinking are often entertaining but seldom useful. I therefore abbreviate my 
explanations for the Court’s incorrect claims about accountability, aware I 
can offer no proof for them. 
That said, the most obvious reason why the Court errs seems to be its 
insistence on making empirical arguments without first consulting the 
empirical literature. I noted earlier that in the many cases in which the Court 
has analyzed accountability, it has never supported its analysis with any 
factual material.320 It has not referred to academic articles, nor has it 
mentioned governmental statistics, newspaper stories, or even anecdotes 
about voters’ ability to reward or punish officeholders in different 
circumstances. Instead, the Court has relied on what Jed Stiglitz has labeled 
“folk theories”—intuitive accounts of how policies relate to accountability 
and other abstract concepts, grounded only in the Court’s instincts and 
citations to the Court’s earlier (and equally non-empirical) cases.321 These 
folk theories are certainly plausible; indeed, their plausibility is why they 
have been embraced so readily. But they are folk rather than real theories 
because they stem from supposition rather than evidence. 
A related explanation is that the Court appears to have an overly 
optimistic opinion of voters’ capabilities. It evidently believes that voters are 
reasonably knowledgeable about officeholders’ records and duties, and 
assess them reasonably objectively. As Justice Scalia once wrote, “the 
American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of 
considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its 
proximate and ultimate source.”322 Given this view of the electorate, it is easy 
 
 320 See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 321 Stiglitz, Folk Theories, supra note 170, at 19. Strikingly, the only non-precedential material to 
receive much attention in the Court’s discussions of accountability is The Federalist. See Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498, 501, 514 (2010). The Federalist is 
impressive in many respects, but empirical analysis is not one of them. 
 322 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258–59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part), rev’d, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he people are not foolish 
but intelligent, and will separate the wheat from the chaff.”), rev’d, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 797 (1983) (“[T]he vast majority of the electorate not only 
is literate but also is informed on a day-to-day basis about events and issues that affect election 
choices . . . .”). 
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to see how the Court could arrive at its positions on accountability. People 
who are neither sheep nor fools should be able to distinguish between 
executive and independent agencies, between free and commandeered state 
governments, and so on. But as discussed at length above, this view of the 
electorate is inaccurate.323 Voters actually tend to be quite uninformed about 
matters of public policy, and quite biased in their judgments by their 
partisanship. The Court fully grasps neither this reality nor its implications 
for the Court’s claims. 
Another possibility along these lines is that the Court may discount the 
significance of factors beyond its control (such as voter psychology) and 
inflate the role of matters it can influence (such as certain institutional 
relations). In the empirical literature on accountability, the minds of voters 
take center stage. Accountability rises or falls based on what voters know, 
how they evaluate it, and on what grounds they choose to vote.324 These 
variables, though, are mostly beyond the Court’s purview. What are in the 
Court’s domain are aspects of governmental structure not directly addressed 
by the Constitution: presidential authority over agencies, federal power over 
the states, and so forth. It is unsurprising that the Court emphasizes these 
aspects, assigning them great weight as causes of accountability, and 
downplays the drivers of voter behavior. If the Court were to acknowledge 
the importance of these drivers, it would also have to concede its own 
inability to change them. 
All of these explanations are basically benign. They attribute the 
Court’s missteps to its unfamiliarity with the empirical scholarship, its rose-
tinted perception of the electorate, or its focus on the tools within its grasp. 
Rubin, though, has suggested a less sympathetic hypothesis: that the Court’s 
accountability claims are essentially a façade, illogical and unsubstantiated 
but “possess[ing] an underlying unity in their hostility to modern 
administrative government.”325 On this account, the Court does not really 
mean what it says when it argues that certain policies raise or lower 
accountability. Rather, it deploys these arguments to accomplish its true 
objective: “elected officials gain[ing] power at the expense of the 
bureaucracy.”326 As Rubin notes, to the extent the Court’s claims prevail, the 
President, Congress, and state governments win clout and federal agencies 
 
 323 See supra Part III. 
 324 See id. 
 325 Rubin, supra note 33, at 2097. 
 326 Id. 
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lose it, and all incumbents are released from the constraints of campaign 
finance regulation.327 
Rubin’s hypothesis violates the old adage never to attribute to malice 
that which can be attributed to incompetence.328 It also relies more than I 
would like on psychoanalysis of the Court’s motivations—a recurrent danger 
when trying to determine why the Court errs. Still, there may be something 
to his theory, especially given the conservative (and so anti-regulatory) 
ideologies of the Justices who have composed most of the Court’s paeans to 
accountability.329 In any event, I think it is very difficult to rate the merits of 
the various reasons for the Court’s mistakes, and I make no further attempt 
to do so. Instead, I turn next from explanation to prescription—specifically, 
to identifying some of the ways in which the Court (and other actors) could 
promote accountability more effectively than they have to date. 
B. Levers 
To improve accountability, it is necessary to satisfy more fully the 
conditions for retrospective voting. It is necessary, that is, to make voters 
more knowledgeable about officeholders’ records, more likely to assess the 
records fairly, more apt to attribute responsibility for them accurately, or 
more inclined to vote based on these assessments and attributions. As I have 
stressed, voters’ mental states are at the heart of these conditions. Voters’ 
mental states, in turn, can be influenced either directly, by changing what 
they know and how they evaluate it, or indirectly, by varying the institutional 
and electoral context in which they find themselves. 
The Court has very little power to affect voter psychology directly. It 
also has much less power than it thinks to shape it indirectly by modifying 
the institutional backdrop. (Indeed, that was the thesis of the previous 
Part.330) But the Court does have at least some ability to alter the electoral 
environment, in particular by making elections more competitive. As 
explained earlier, competition and accountability are tightly linked because 
voters become better informed and more prone to voting retrospectively 
when races are closer.331 
 
 327 See id. Rubin does not address campaign finance regulation, so I am guessing at his position on 
it. 
 328 See Hanlon’s Razor, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hanlon%27s_razor&oldid=819810925 
[https://perma.cc/7FAU-4MMV]. 
 329 The only exceptions are Justice Breyer in a pair of administrative law cases, see supra notes 95–
96 and accompanying text, and Justice Brennan in a congressional nondelegation case, see supra note 
107 and accompanying text. These are quite minor opinions in the accountability canon. 
 330 See supra Part III. 
 331 See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text. 
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One way the Court could make elections more competitive should 
already be apparent. Rather than striking down campaign finance laws (as 
has been its wont in recent years), the Court could uphold them. It is 
reasonably clear that contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public 
financing result in narrower contests by reducing incumbents’ spending 
advantage.332 A Court intent on fostering accountability could acquiesce in 
these policies rather than subjecting them to stringent scrutiny. 
Another tack the Court could try is nullifying bipartisan gerrymanders 
that protect both parties’ incumbents from any serious challenge. These 
kinds of district plans are typically enacted in states where neither party fully 
controls the state government. Unable to engage in partisan gerrymandering, 
the parties agree on maps that allocate safe seats to almost all sitting 
legislators. Plainly, such maps suppress competition by prioritizing seat 
safety above other redistricting considerations. Equally plainly, the Court 
could enhance competition by refusing to countenance them.333 
A further proposal is for the Court to intensify its review of regulations 
that make it difficult for third-party candidates to qualify for the general 
election ballot.334 These rules usually take the form of large numbers of 
signatures that need to be gathered by an early deadline, and they tend to be 
backed by the major parties, which prefer not to face third-party 
opposition.335 The rules, it is true, do not necessarily decrease the winning 
candidate’s margin of victory. Rather, their electoral impact depends on the 
relative appeal of the major-party candidates and on which of them would be 
more harmed by the entry of a third-party challenger. But in his valuable 
work on the topic, Jones determined that it is not just a lower margin of 
victory that heightens accountability, but also broader notions of competition 
such as ideological divergence.336 Third-party candidates certainly contribute 
to such divergence, so if the Court facilitated their ballot access, it would 
also render major-party incumbents more accountable. 
All of these ideas for judicial intervention involve the lever of 
increasing competition. Again, this is because the Court’s tools do not allow 
it to change voters’ mental states directly or to revise the governmental 
 
 332 See supra Section III.D.1. 
 333 For a well-known proposal along these lines, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and 
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 600 (2002) (characterizing “the risk in gerrymandering” as 
“constriction of the competitive processes by which voters can express choice”). 
 334 Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have supported this idea too. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard 
H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 683–
84 (1998) (criticizing “a bipolar effort to frustrate third-party challenges” by banning fusion candidacies). 
 335 See id. at 684. 
 336 See Jones, supra note 303, at 500 (also finding that demographic diversity increases 
accountability). 
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structures that regulate accountability. Other actors, though, do possess these 
potent tools, and could use them in a variety of ways. With respect to voter 
psychology, the media has the capacity both to inform voters and to induce 
them to make more accurate responsibility attributions. In a useful study, 
Stephanie Larson placed a series of articles about a House member in a local 
newspaper, and then tracked awareness of the member’s positions among 
respondents who saw and did not see the publication. Respondents who came 
across the newspaper learned more about the member’s stances, indicating 
that press coverage can boost voter knowledge.337 
Also intriguingly, Shanto Iyengar conducted a series of experiments in 
which he manipulated the framing of television coverage of poverty. Some 
segments employed “episodic” framing emphasizing specific events and 
persons, while other segments relied on “thematic” framing discussing the 
issue more generally.338 Episodic frames encouraged respondents to attribute 
responsibility to individual victims or perpetrators, while thematic frames 
prompted attributions to governmental officials or policies.339 At present, 
“television news is heavily episodic,” meaning that it “effectively insulates 
incumbent officials from any rising tide of disenchantment over the state of 
public affairs.”340 If television coverage became more thematic, though, 
“Americans might be more apt to consider society or government . . . 
responsible.”341 
While the media may be the institution with the most sway over voter 
psychology, other bodies could also have an impact. The schools, for 
instance, could do a better job educating students about the architecture of 
American government. If students knew more about how federal, state, and 
local authorities are organized, they might find it easier to assign 
responsibility for salient developments.342 Similarly, several scholars have 
called for the creation of “accountability agencies” that would collect and 
 
 337 Stephanie Greco Larson, Information and Learning in a Congressional District: A Social 
Experiment, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1102, 1109 (1990). Not only can press coverage make voters more 
knowledgeable, it can also make officeholders more electorally accountable for their roll call votes. See 
Rogers, supra note 252, at 15–16 (finding that state legislators’ extremism has more negative electoral 
consequences when there are more newspaper reporters covering the state government). 
 338 SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?: HOW TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 14 
(1991). 
 339 Id. at 67. 
 340 Id. at 16, 137. 
 341 Id. at 67; see also, e.g., Edwards et al., supra note 148, at 119 (finding that greater media coverage 
of an issue increases the President’s accountability for that issue); Maestas et al., supra note 265, at 622 
(finding that more exposure to media coverage of Hurricane Katrina increased respondents’ likelihood of 
blaming both the federal and state governments for their responses to the storm). 
 342 See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987) (discussing the importance of 
civic education in a democracy). 
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disseminate information about money in politics, public corruption, the state 
of the economy, and other sensitive subjects.343 Assuming this information 
reached voters, it could help them understand how their government has 
performed and who is to credit or blame for the performance. 
Still another suggestion for facilitating retrospective voting is to add 
more data to the ballot itself. In local elections, ballots are often nonpartisan, 
thus barring candidates from stating their party affiliation. Permitting 
candidates to make this statement, in Christopher Elmendorf and David 
Schleicher’s words, would give voters “a simple, ballot-based indicator of 
whether a given candidate would join the dominant coalition or work against 
it.”344 More ambitiously, Elmendorf and Schleicher recommend that the 
ballot specify the partisan balance of power—that is, which party controls 
the executive branch and each chamber of the legislature.345 Voters 
frequently lack this vital information for attributing responsibility, so if they 
were presented with it, their attribution errors might become less common. 
And once the ballot has been opened to unconventional material, even more 
adventurous options are available. Why not also include key economic and 
social indicators, the government’s fiscal condition, or incumbents’ ideal 
points derived from their roll call votes?346 
The final lever for promoting accountability is institutional. Unlike the 
ones that have preoccupied the Court, certain aspects of governmental 
structure do make a difference, typically by influencing how voters assign 
responsibility. At all levels of government, term limits are one such aspect. 
Incumbents who must leave office at the end of their terms can be neither 
rewarded nor punished for what they do in those final periods. Regardless of 
their records, they again become civilians when their terms expire. For this 
reason, Campbell and his coauthors347 and Thomas Holbrook348 found that 
 
 343 See Manin et al., supra note 38, at 50 (listing several such agencies); Mark E. Warren, 
Accountability and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 39, 49 (Mark 
Bovens et al. eds., 2014) (same). 
 344 Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 166, at 387. Of course, information on party affiliation would 
facilitate partisan voting in addition to making it easier for voters to attribute responsibility. 
 345 Id. at 413. 
 346 Cf. Andrew Healy & Gabriel S. Lenz, Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond 
Primarily to the Election-Year Economy, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 31, 43–44 (2014) (finding that subjects 
evaluate prior economic conditions more rationally when given information about cumulative (rather than 
annual) growth). The courts would also have a limited role to play here—namely, not to invalidate the 
unorthodox ballots. Cf. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525–26 (2001) (striking down a Missouri voter 
initiative that required ballots to note if incumbents had failed to support congressional term limits). 
 347 Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 1093 (“In each and every test . . . retrospective voting was found 
to be significantly weaker in open-seat elections.”). 
 348 Thomas M. Holbrook, Incumbency, National Conditions, and the 2012 Presidential Election, 
45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 640, 641 (2012) (“The impact of personal finances and presidential approval is 
much greater in incumbent races . . . than in open-seat contests . . . .”). 
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retrospective voting is significantly less common in open-seat presidential 
elections. Also for this reason, eliminating term limits would boost 
accountability by increasing the likelihood of incumbents appearing on the 
ballot. 
Another condition that boosts accountability at all levels is unified 
government. When the same party controls both the executive and legislative 
branches, it is clearer to voters whom to credit or blame for past events. 
Conversely, when authority is divided, it is less obvious which officeholders 
are responsible for the government’s record. Consistent with this reasoning, 
Kevin Leyden and Stephen Borrelli,349 and Robert Lowry and his 
coauthors,350 showed that incumbent governors’ vote shares are more 
sensitive to state unemployment and the state budgetary situation, 
respectively, under unified government. Likewise, Duch and Stevenson 
determined that the incumbent party’s presidential performance is less 
closely tied to voters’ perceptions of the economy under divided 
government.351 
Of course, neither the Court nor any other actor can guarantee unified 
government—at least, not as long as powers are separated rather than 
combined. However, state and local authorities may have some ability to 
make their elections more first-order, and so less dominated by national 
forces, by changing the elections’ dates. In a series of comparative studies, 
Timothy Hellwig and David Samuels found that when legislative and 
executive elections are held concurrently, variables pertaining to the 
executive largely explain the legislative results.352 But when the elections are 
held separately, “nonconcurrence . . . attenuate[s] the impact of national 
factors” and “focuses voters’ and candidates’ energies on local factors.”353 
The upshot is that state and local incumbents might become more 
accountable for their own records if they were not on the same ballot as 
 
 349 See Kevin M. Leyden & Stephen A. Borrelli, The Effect of State Economic Conditions on 
Gubernatorial Elections: Does Unified Government Make a Difference?, 48 POL. RES. Q. 275, 283 
(1995). 
 350 Lowry et al., supra note 286, at 765. 
 351 DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 230, at 258 tbl.9.1. Relatedly, legislators’ accountability is also 
higher when their parties are more cohesive. See David R. Jones, Partisan Polarization and 
Congressional Accountability in House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 323, 329 (2010). 
 352 See Timothy Hellwig & David Samuels, Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic 
Regimes, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 65, 76 (2008) (considering the state of the economy and whether an 
incumbent president was running for reelection); Samuels, supra note 38, at 431 (same and also 
considering whether the president was in a minority government or in a coalition); see also Wolak, supra 
note 308, at 220, 222, 225 (finding that gubernatorial spending usually reduces voter recognition, recall, 
and knowledge of House candidates). 
 353 Samuels, supra note 38, at 427; see also Hellwig & Samuels, supra note 352, at 76. 
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national politicians, especially the President. Then their records might be less 
swamped by national trends.354 
Another way to improve state and local accountability could be to 
transfer policymaking authority away from the legislature and to the 
executive. Voters know more about national than subnational politics—but 
subnationally, they know more about governors and mayors than state 
legislatures and city councils. Governors and mayors are much more 
recognizable than subnational legislators,355 and there is evidence of at least 
some retrospective voting in gubernatorial and mayoral elections.356 
Accordingly, if states augmented governors’ appointment and veto powers, 
and if cities switched from weak to strong mayors, they would add to the 
clout of the one officeholder who can realistically (though still partially) be 
held accountable for her actions.357 
In theory, these same shifts could be carried out at the federal level. 
Congressional elections could be made fully nonconcurrent with presidential 
ones, thus rendering them less second-order.358 Or the President’s powers 
could be formally enhanced at the expense of Congress’s, thus concentrating 
authority in the single official whose elections are most first-order.359 In 
practice, these reforms are blocked by the Constitution. Both the timing of 
congressional elections and the explicit powers of the President and 
Congress can be changed only by constitutional amendment. 
 
 354 One downside of nonconcurrent elections, though, is significantly reduced turnout. See ZOLTAN 
HAJNAL, AMERICA’S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY: RACE, TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION IN CITY POLITICS 
159 (2010). State and local governments may therefore face a tradeoff between accountability and 
participation. 
 355 See, e.g., Atkeson & Partin, supra note 273, at 101 (“[T]he governor is the second most 
recognized elected official, behind the president.”); Schleicher, supra note 236, at 776 (noting that mayors 
“are sufficiently high profile that the electorate is able to reward them for good performance”). 
 356 See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text; see also R. Douglas Arnold & Nicholas Carnes, 
Holding Mayors Accountable: New York’s Executives from Koch to Bloomberg, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 949, 
958 (2012) (finding that New York City’s mayor is held accountable for the city’s economic conditions 
and crime rates). 
 357 Interestingly, Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen argue that unbundling the executive’s powers 
would increase accountability, by enabling voters to reward or punish officials for the particular decisions 
that are within their substantive domains. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled 
Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1403–05 (2008). Berry and Gersen’s argument is primarily 
theoretical, though, and assumes implausibly high levels of voter knowledge. See Schleicher, supra note 
236, at 817 (offering a similar rejoinder). 
 358 For a detailed discussion of the problems with concurrent voting in federal elections, see David 
J. Andersen, Pushing the Limits of Democracy: Concurrent Elections and Cognitive Limitations of Voters 
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with Northwestern University Law 
Review). 
 359 Cf. Ryan E. Carlin & Shane P. Singh, Executive Power and Economic Accountability, 77 J. POL. 
1031, 1037–41 (2015) (finding in a comparative study that presidential accountability for the economy is 
higher when the president has more legislative power and issues more decrees). 
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The Constitution also bars even more effective means for heightening 
the federal government’s accountability. A sizeable comparative literature, 
launched a generation ago by G. Bingham Powell and Guy Whitten, 
concludes that both pillars of the American system—the separation of 
powers and federalism—impede retrospective voting.360 Thanks to the 
separation of powers, voters often cannot tell which branch (and which 
chamber within Congress) is responsible for a given development. Similarly, 
thanks to federalism, voters tend to have trouble distinguishing between 
federal and state duties. Both of these problems are alleviated by fusing 
rather than separating the national government’s powers and by abrogating 
the sovereignty of subnational units—in short, by switching to a 
parliamentary and unitary system like Great Britain’s.361 Accountability 
reaches its apogee in this sort of system, especially when a single party 
commands a parliamentary majority, because the clarity of responsibility is 
maximized. 
The point of this discussion is not that any of these reforms should be 
implemented, let alone that the American model should be scrapped in favor 
of the British one. Rather, there are two reasons why it is worth considering 
the various techniques through which accountability could be fostered. The 
first is the techniques’ very existence, which demonstrates that even though 
the Court has not managed to further this value through its interventions, the 
value is not incapable of being advanced. In fact, both the Court and other 
actors have several tools at their disposal that could make American 
government substantially more accountable than it is today. 
The second reason is to highlight the oddity of pursuing accountability 
in a regime that is, to a considerable extent, designed to frustrate it. Federal, 
state, and local authorities operate side by side in the United States, and each 
of them is divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which 
themselves are segmented even further.362 True, the extraordinary complexity 
 
 360 G. Bingham Powell, Jr. & Guy D. Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: 
Taking Account of the Political Context, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 391, 398 (1993) (concluding that “[t]he 
greater the perceived unified control of policymaking by the incumbent government, the more likely is 
the citizen to assign responsibility . . . to the incumbents.”); cf., Cameron D. Anderson, Economic Voting 
and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 449, 456–57 
(2006) (studying federalism); Johns, supra note 58, at 70 (same); Richard Nadeau et al., A Cross-National 
Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context Across Time and Nations, 
21 ELECTORAL STUD. 403, 413 (2002) (studying the separation of powers); Samuels, supra note 38, at 
430–32 (same). 
 361 See DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 230, at 72 (showing that retrospective economic voting is 
stronger in Great Britain than in all but one of the other countries in the study). 
 362 See Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information 
Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 371 (2010) (“[T]he structures through 
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of this system could be greatly reduced, in which case accountability would 
rise sharply. But any such effort at rationalization would clash with the 
dispersion of power that is the system’s basic premise. Exaggerating only a 
bit, one might say that unaccountability is the American way, and 
accountability is un-American. 
C. Alternatives 
There are compelling arguments, then, against the Court’s campaign to 
promote accountability through its constitutional jurisprudence. To date, this 
campaign has mostly failed to bear fruit. There are only a few other ways in 
which the Court could try to make officeholders more accountable, all reliant 
on the link between competition and accountability. And while not an 
unappealing value, accountability is in tension with what the Court itself has 
described as the American “system of division and separation of powers,” 
which “produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance.”363 
Moreover, as Jacob Gersen and Matthew Stephenson have recently 
emphasized, accountability is not an unalloyed good. The crux of the 
problem is that agents (that is, officeholders) who are accountable still have 
incentives to act contrary to the interests of an imperfectly informed principal 
(that is, voters).364 For example, agents might “pander” by enacting popular 
but imprudent policies rather than unpopular policies that serve the 
principal’s long-term welfare.365 Or agents might “posture” by taking 
needlessly bold actions,366 or “persist” in adhering to positions even after they 
have been shown to be unwise.367 Because of the possibility of these and 
other harmful behaviors, Gersen and Stephenson propose several measures 
through which accountability could be curbed.368 
But if the Court stopped aiming to improve accountability in its 
constitutional cases, what might it do instead? Perhaps the most intuitive 
option, urged by Stiglitz, is to fall back on more conventional modes of 
 
which [the United States] is governed are probably the most complicated and confusing of any 
contemporary democracy.”). 
 363 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). 
 364 Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 187 (“The over-accountability problem is essentially an 
information problem: sometimes even a fully rational but imperfectly informed principal . . . will reward 
‘bad’ actions rather than ‘good’ actions by an agent . . . .”); see also Warren, supra note 343, at 43–45 
(making a similar point). 
 365 See Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 195–98. 
 366 Id. at 198–200. 
 367 Id. at 200–02. 
 368 Id. at 209–31. For another critique of accountability, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT 
OF REPRESENTATION 58 (1967) (noting that from an accountability perspective, there is nothing 
objectionable about an officeholder “act[ing] in a completely selfish and irresponsible manner . . . as long 
as he let himself be removed from office at the end of his term”). 
112:989 (2018) Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law 
1065 
argument: text, history, precedent, and so on.369 When these modes are 
enough to decide a case, that could be the Court’s holding. When they do not 
suffice, the Court could decline to resolve the dispute one way or another. 
Reasoning along similar lines, Huq has advised against the invocation of 
democratic values whenever “there is no reliable and stable correlation 
between a rule of decision and those underlying values.”370 In these 
situations, he would simply deem the matter nonjusticiable.371 
There is much to like about this approach. Its modesty, in particular, is 
quite attractive in an era in which the Court is all too ready to exert its will 
over vast swathes of American life. A Court that refrained from relying on 
democratic values would also be a Court that refrained from making mistakes 
based on those values. Unlike our actual Court, it would not nullify 
policies—limits on the President’s removal power, delegations of authority 
by Congress, federal mandates to the states, regulations of money in 
politics—that are thought to lessen accountability, but in fact do not affect 
or even increase it. 
But while these points carry weight, I ultimately find them 
unpersuasive. Pro-democratic judicial intervention is not especially 
immodest; rather, as John Hart Ely argued long ago, it implies a more limited 
role for the Court than judicial review based on liberty, equality, and other 
contested non-electoral concepts.372 That its track record has been poor with 
respect to accountability also does not mean the Court would be as prone to 
error if it sought to advance other democratic values. It might be clearer how 
judicial decisions would impact other values, and the Court might have a 
greater capacity to attain them. 
The list of democratic goods is long, but typically includes (among 
others) popular participation in politics, deliberation by citizens and 
officeholders, governmental responsiveness to voters’ preferences, and 
governmental alignment with voters’ preferences.373 (Responsiveness and 
alignment differ in that the former refers to the rate of change of 
representation or policy given a shift in voters’ positions, while the latter 
 
 369 See Stiglitz, Folk Theories and Constitutional Values, supra note 170, at 18 (“[C]ourts might 
explicitly disavow functionalist motivations as the basis for interpretive stances on structural questions.”). 
 370 Huq, supra note 170, at 5. 
 371 Id. 
 372 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 373 See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections 
on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1142 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, 
Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 685, 690 (2004); 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 313–16. 
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denotes the congruence of representation or policy with voters’ views.374) 
This is not the place for full assessments of what constitutional law would 
look like if it prioritized each of these goods. Instead, I offer three brief 
observations about the alternatives to accountability. 
First, participation and deliberation seem ill-suited for star turns 
because they would sweep either not far enough or much too far. Doctrine 
based on these values would be too confined in its reach if it extended only 
to the relatively few policies that directly burden citizens’ ability to vote or 
to debate public affairs.375 Conversely, if the Court were willing to call into 
question laws that were enacted without sufficient participation or 
deliberation, then it is hard to say what statutes would be safe. These values 
are rarely targeted overtly, but they are also rarely present to the extent we 
might like. 
Second, responsiveness appears to have the same drawback as 
accountability: that empirically, there is little the Court can do to further it.376 
In earlier work, Eric McGhee, Steven Rogers, and I calculated the 
responsiveness of median state house members’ ideologies to shifts in voter 
sentiment from 1992 to 2012.377 We then analyzed whether a host of electoral 
policies—political party regulations, campaign finance laws, redistricting 
rules, and aspects of governmental structure—affected responsiveness.378 
Essentially none of these policies had any impact.379 As we put it, 
responsiveness “does not budge in either direction due to the policies with 
which states experiment,” and “is serenely impervious to reform.”380 A Court 
that wished to heighten responsiveness would thus quickly find itself at a 
loss. It would not be able to vary the value much either by upholding policies 
or by striking them down.381 
 
 374 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L. REV. 761, 
780 (2015). 
 375 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 357–58 (discussing the few areas of election law to which 
participation is particularly relevant). But see RON LEVY & GRAEME ORR, THE LAW OF DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 23–24 (2016) (considering how election law might incorporate the insights of deliberative 
democracy). 
 376 Interestingly, responsiveness is the value that critics of accountability have often argued should 
replace it. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 53, at 290; Schacter, supra note 35, at 15. 
 377 Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 374, at 792–93. 
 378 Id. at 806–24. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. at 834; see also Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal 
Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 615–20 (2014) (finding that electoral institutions do not affect 
responsiveness at the municipal level). 
 381 However, the Court might be able to rely on the link that also seems to exist between competition 
and responsiveness. See John D. Griffin, Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A 
Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis, 68 J. POL. 911, 915–19 (2006). 
112:989 (2018) Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law 
1067 
And third, this empirical difficulty does not apply to alignment. To the 
contrary, McGhee, Rogers, and I found that numerous policies are 
statistically significant drivers of representational congruence, at the levels 
of both the individual district and the legislative chamber as a whole. For 
instance, contribution limits shrink the ideological gap between legislators 
and their constituents, and redistricting commissions do the same with 
respect to the median legislator and the median voter statewide.382 Likewise, 
certain types of party primaries, certain redistricting criteria, and term limits 
widen the divide between legislators and voters.383 There would therefore be 
plenty for an alignment-minded Court to do. Unlike with accountability and 
responsiveness, its efforts, if grounded in solid evidence rather than folk 
theory, would not yield mostly null results. 
Of course, empirical tractability is not the only criterion by which a 
democratic value should be chosen. The value’s place in the American 
historical tradition, its role in prior cases, and its normative appeal are all 
important yardsticks too. My claim, then, is not that the Court should 
necessarily drop accountability from its constitutional jurisprudence and 
replace it with alignment. Rather, I merely think that before embarking on 
any mission of pro-democratic judicial intervention, the Court should 
carefully consider the mission’s likelihood of success. Quixotic quests may 
inspire great literature, but they do not make for sound doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Several legal scholars have noted the Court’s tendency to wield 
electoral accountability “as a rhetorical trump card . . . to justify particular 
institutional arrangements or legal/constitutional positions.”384 In this 
Article, I have tried to show that accountability has no (or almost no) 
business being used in this way. Contrary to the Court’s assertions, the 
President is not more accountable for agency actions when she exerts more 
control over the bodies; Congress is not more accountable for decisions it 
does not delegate to agencies but rather makes itself; state governments are 
not more accountable when they are not federally commandeered; and 
incumbent politicians are not more accountable when campaign spending is 
unregulated. At least, any gains in accountability in these circumstances are 
so small and contingent that they cannot support the invalidation of properly 
enacted policies. 
 
 382 Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 374, at 810–15. 
 383 Id. at 806–09, 813–18. 
 384 Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 36, at 232; see also, e.g., Merrill, supra note 110, at 2141; 
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If accountability were to lose its trump card status, it is not clear how 
the Court’s constitutional reasoning would change. The Court could analyze 
a range of conventional factors without giving pride of place to any of them. 
It could anoint another democratic value, like alignment, as the linchpin of 
its case law. Or, as Guy-Uriel Charles has counseled, it could exercise its 
power of judicial review only if multiple democratic goods were 
threatened.385 What is clear, though, is that it is time for the Court’s 
constitutional deck to be reshuffled. Accountability, a value the Court has 
tried and failed to promote for decades, does not belong on top of it. 
 
 385 Charles, supra note 373, at 1106. 
